The Wittenberg Concord

The Wittenberg Concord was a sacramental confessional statement agreed upon by Lutheran and Reformed theologians in 1536, including Martin Luther and Martin Bucer. It was a good-faith effort to unite the various parties of the Reformation in the hope of advancing the Kingdom of Christ together. Here is a snippet from Jensen's work about the section on the Lord’s Supper:

The first part of the Concord addresses Christ’s presence in the sacrament of the altar. The South German statement accepted by the Lutherans begins with a reference to Irenaeus’s distinction between earthly and heavenly things, which provided Bucer and his colleagues with “a stable foundation” for the sacramental union between the earthly elements of the meal and the body of Christ. It was on this basis that Bucer could argue that in the elements the body of Christ is “truly and substantially present, offered, and received” (adesse, exhiberi et sumi).

While the translations of these three words do not fit nicely into English language formulas, these words were crucial to the Lutheran and South German interpretation of Christ’s presence in the meal. Moreover, these three words were the focus of discussion in Kassel in December 1534 and in the 1535 Augsburg Articles.

The second Latin word in the formula "exhibere" is the key word in understanding the debate over the real presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper and the depth of the agreement found in the Wittenberg Concord formula. However, the use of the word exhibere is also problematic, simply because it carries so many meanings. Nevertheless, in Luther’s December 17, 1534 “Thoughts,” he deliberately included this word in order to address four problematic teachings concerning the sacrament of the altar, and it shows up again in the Wittenberg Concord.

(1) First, the word “offered” (exhibere) provided for Luther a deliberate counterbalance to the Swiss theologians, who understood it to mean “shows,” “signifies,” or “points to.” In discussing the words of institution, Zwingli insisted that “This is my body” should be understood as “signifies” or “points to.” Zwingli states,

“This verb “is,” then, is in my judgment used here for “signifies.” Yet this is not my judgment, but that of eternal God; for we cannot boast of anything which Christ wrought not in us, Rom. 15:18; and it has been abundantly shown above that since faith is from the unseen God, it points to the unseen God and is a thing absolutely independent of all sense. For whatever is body, whatever is an object of sense, can in no way be a matter of faith.”

The Lutherans, however, felt that this treated the Lord’s Supper as a memorial, something pointing a person to the cross but that in and of itself was not important. In addressing the same interpretation by Oecolampadius, Luther wrote:

"The sacrament or act, and the words which one speaks concerning it, are two different things. The sacrament or act must indeed be a sign or figure of something else, but the words in their simplicity must signify nothing else than what they say. For example, Moses’ paschal lamb must indeed prefigure and signify Christ. But the words which Moses uses in speaking of the paschal lamb must express simply this same paschal lamb, and nothing else. Again, circumcision must indeed prefigure the slaying of [the old] Adam. But the words which Moses uses in speaking of circumcision must refer literally to the physical circumcision. Again, baptism must signify the drowning of sins, but the words used to describe baptism must express simply the plunging into the water. So, too, the sacrament of the Supper must indeed prefigure and signify something, viz. the unity of Christians in one spiritual body of Christ through one spirit, faith, love, and the cross, etc. But the words used in connection with this sacrament shall and must express with simplicity what they say. But my friend Oecolampadius blindly hits upon a true Zwinglian alloeosis, switches madly in the dark to a figurative meaning and makes out of a form of a thing a figure of speech, in this manner: ‘The object is figurative, therefore words pertaining to figurative objects are figurative!’ You know, this gives all the appearance of a good old simpleton of a priest who has innocently stumbled into this debate, and would better have remained outside!"

Zwingli and Oecolampadius both insisted that forgiveness itself cannot be found in the sacrament; the source of forgiveness is the cross alone. However, in article 10 of the Apology, Melanchthon interpreted the term exhibere as “offered” or “distributed” and not simply as showing or pointing to something else. In article 24 of the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon states that it is not enough to point to, or remember, the history, which is all a memorial understanding can do. People need the sacrament of the altar to console them and grant forgiveness in their lives in the present time. As Melanchthon states:

“For to remember Christ is to remember his benefits and realize that they are truly offered to us; and it is not enough to remember the history, for the Jews and the ungodly can also remember this. Consequently, the mass is to be used to this end, that the sacrament is administered to those who have need of consolation.”

People need Christ’s forgiving presence in their lives to be consoled. A memory is not enough. This is why Christ’s presence in the Supper is so important. Forgiveness is distributed where it is needed.

(2) Second, Luther insisted that the word exhibere (translated as “distributed”) challenged the Swiss theologians’ separation of the cross event from the Lord’s Supper, rendering the meal non-efficacious. For example, Zwingli had asserted:

“I believe, indeed I know, that all the sacraments are so far from conferring grace that they do not even convey or [distribute] it.”

Zwingli’s claim led Sasse to state, "The sacrament for Zwingli is not part and parcel of the Gospel. It is an ordinance of Christ, to be performed by Christians. This performance may have some effect on the soul of the faithful, in so far as the “sign” makes the Word of God clearer. But the sacraments can never be a means of grace in the strict sense. They only signify the grace that has been given without them."

For Zwingli, the most that the Supper could do was to point to the source of God’s grace and forgiveness: the cross. It could not give forgiveness, however. In response to their concerns, Luther clarified the Lutheran position in his 1528 Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper:

"[Zwingli] does not know that the merit of Christ and the distribution of merit are two different things. . . . Christ has once for all merited and won for us the forgiveness of sins on the cross; but this forgiveness he distributes wherever he is, at all times and in all places, as Luke writes, chapter 24[:46–47], 'Thus it is written, that Christ had to suffer and on the third day rise (in this consists his merit), and that repentance and forgiveness of sins should be preached in his name (here the distribution of his merit comes in).' This is why we say there is forgiveness of sins in the Supper, not on account of the eating, nor because Christ merits or achieves forgiveness of sins there, but on account of the word through which he distributes among us this acquired forgiveness, saying, “This is my body which is given for you.” . . . Hence there is distributed here the forgiveness of sins, which however was obtained on the cross."

Luther is not content, however, to argue only that Christ’s presence in the meal is the channel through which he distributes forgiveness. He also claims that forgiveness is distributed whenever the gospel is proclaimed:

“But we know that Christ has died for us once, and that he distributes this death through preaching, baptizing, the Spirit, reading, believing, eating, and in whatever way he wishes, wherever he is, and whatever he is, and whatever he does.”

The crucial point that he wanted to make was that if the forgiveness obtained at the cross by Christ cannot be distributed, then his sacrifice on the cross is a historic, rather than salvific, event.

(3) Third, the translation of exhibere as “distribute” allowed the Lutherans to join with the South Germans in rejecting the teaching of transubstantiation or impanation, or local inclusion.

In the First Confession of Basel, the Swiss took a strong stance against this when they stated, “we do not confine the natural, true, and substantial body of Christ, [that was] born from a pure virgin, suffered for us, and that ascended into heaven . . . in the bread and wine of the Lord.”

In the Wittenberg Concord, the Lutherans observed of the South Germans:

"And although they do not hold to transubstantiation, nor do they hold that the body and blood of Christ are locally or spatially enclosed in the bread or in any other way permanently united with it, outside of the partaking of the sacrament, they nevertheless acknowledge that through sacramental union the bread is the body of Christ; that is, they hold that when the bread is offered, the body of Christ is at the same time present and truly offered."

In the First Helvetic Confession, agreed to by the Swiss only a few months earlier, the Swiss evangelicals had pointedly rejected the idea that “the body and blood of the Lord are either joined naturally to the bread and wine, or included locally in them, or placed in them by any carnal presence.”

Taking any other stance would be enough for them to completely reject the Lutheran overtures, as presented by Bucer. Moreover, the Swiss Reformers rejected transubstantiation as an explanation of Christ’s localized presence in the bread and wine, and not just at the cross, for that would mean that one could obtain Christ’s forgiveness of sins in a place other than the cross.

This was not what the Lutherans argued, however. While they rejected transubstantiation as an explanation of how bread and wine became Christ’s body and blood, they insisted that Christ’s forgiveness in the meal was not obtained independently of the forgiveness won on the cross. Instead, the crucified Christ distributes the forgiveness won on the cross in the elements, to everyone in need. The forgiveness obtained at the cross in a past event is distributed to the gathered community in the present. The distribution of the body of Christ was, for Melanchthon, the antidote to transubstantiation or local inclusion. As Fraenkel notes,

“Its place [exhibere] in the Augustana is no doubt also due to the role it played in the Wittenberg Concord and indeed in all of Melanchthon’s dealings with Bucer, ever since 1530 in Augsburg, when after interviewing Bucer in the matter of the Sacraments, he reported to Luther that the Strassburger denied both Transubstantiation and a local inclusion of Christ.”

On this point, Bucer and the Lutherans agreed. Bucer reflects the Lutheran use of “distributed” in article 6 of the 1534 Constance Articles and again in article 8 of the 1535 Augsburg Articles. The focus should be on the “distribution” and “use” of the sacrament, rather than Christ’s presence in the bread and wine, in and of itself.

After the Wittenberg Concord was signed, Melanchthon continued to insist that “Christ is truly present in the Sacrament but avoided precise definition of the manner of Christ’s presence, not mentioning Christ’s body and blood, and emphasizing above all the sacraments’ function.” The sacrament of the altar is a means of grace, not because Christ’s essential and substantial presence is put on display (shown), but only as it is distributed, received, and eaten. As the Wittenberg Concord notes, “outside of the partaking . . . [we] do not hold that Christ’s body is present.”

(4) Fourth, the Lutherans emphasized the word “distributed” because the very action of distributing Christ’s real presence is a proclamation of the word. This word proclaims the gospel: the forgiveness of sins, life, and salvation. Making Christ present through the transubstantiation of an objective substance is replaced with Christ’s objective, real presence being distributed in the life-giving word, given “for us and our salvation.”

Apart from the distribution of the word, the meal is nothing but bread and wine, just as “without the Word of God, the water is plain water and not a baptism.” Regarding the Lord’s Supper, Luther says,

“These words, when accompanied by the physical eating and drinking, are the essential thing in the sacrament, and whoever believes these very words has what they declare and state, namely, ‘forgiveness of sins.’”

Outside of this partaking, even though a person “sets the bread aside and keeps it in tabernacles or carries it around and displays it in processions,” it is of no avail unless Christ is distributed and eaten. Only when Christ himself is distributed can the sacrament be “for us and for our salvation.”

The words, “given for you,” are extremely important for a penitent seeking life and salvation. In the sacrament, the forgiveness of sins, life, and salvation are given or distributed.

The nuances in the interpretation for the word “exhibere” posed a real challenge for the negotiators in Wittenberg. Debates continue on whether the South Germans and Wittenberg theologians agreed on the meaning of “distributed.”

Nevertheless, the next generation of Lutherans were satisfied with what the Wittenberg Concord said in this matter, since they readily quoted from the Concord in their 1577 Formula of Concord. As it states, “with the bread and wine the body and blood of Christ are truly and essentially present, distributed and received.” This was what mattered

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The Wittenberg Concord: https://www.amazon.com/Wittenberg-Concord-Creating-Dialogue-Quarterly/dp/1506431569

Johann Gerhard on True Apostolic Succession

There are two kinds of succession: one of places and persons, the other of doctrine. You could call the former external and the latter internal. The succession of places and persons is an external, changeable accident and is not good for anything without succession of doctrine. But succession of doctrine is proper to the true church. “Some persons taking the place of others does not constitute succession. Rather, it is the perpetual consensus of doctrine, which joins later people to earlier people by the bond of faith,” as Gelasius writes correctly (Comment. bk. 3 Irenaei, ch. 3). Therefore we argue against this mark as follows:

First, it does not always apply to the church

(I) Whatever does not always and perpetually apply to the church cannot be its true and proper mark. Yet succession does not apply to the church perpetually and always. Therefore it is not its true and proper mark.

The minor premise is obvious because there was a true, apostolic church before there was such a succession, namely, in the beginning. Nor is “the church called ‘apostolic’ because of succession from the apostles,” as Bellarmine suspects. Rather, it is called “apostolic” from its apostolic doctrine, since in the Apostles’ Creed, which Bellarmine (De justification., bk. 1, ch. 9) claims “was composed by the apostles themselves,” the church is called “apostolic,” though such a succession did not yet exist in it; the apostles themselves were still teaching. The early church in which Christ and the apostles taught was the flowering of the church, yet it lacked that local, personal succession. After all, whom did Christ succeed? Whom did the apostles succeed? The Epistle to the Hebrews shows that Christ is a priest after the order of Melchizedek. Therefore He succeeded Melchizedek. Therefore the true succession can be interrupted, provided that it has the succession of doctrine connected with it. Paul says in 2 Tim. 1:3 that he serves God “from his forefathers,” that is, from Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, etc. Therefore he is proving his faith by an interrupted succession through his forefathers, who had belonged to the sect of the Pharisees. When Stephen was accused of false doctrine (Acts 7), he appealed to Abraham, and beginning from him, he went down to the time of the Babylonian captivity, and then to the very times in which he had lived, covering about four hundred years.

The apostles were the true successors of the prophets because they both received and spread the prophets’ pure doctrine. They were the true successors of Aaron because they followed his faith. Yet they succeeded neither the prophets nor Aaron immediately with regard to place. In the same way, those people who sincerely embrace the faith and doctrine of the apostles, as comprehended in their writings, must be considered the true successors of the apostles, even though they do not have that external, local succession.

With reference to the apostles, heretical priests, gravely erring in faith, most recently preceded them. Yet this does not at all oppose the doctrinal succession by which the apostles succeeded the prophets, Aaron, and other devout priests with regard to the ecclesiastical ministry. In the same way, the doctrinal succession was interrupted by a corrupt ministry. Yet this does not at all oppose that doctrinal succession by which the devout and orthodox ministers of the church succeed those who sincerely embrace the apostolic faith.

The apostles appealed to the internal, doctrinal succession over a local, external succession, of which Caiaphas could boast, when they bore public witness that they were teaching “nothing but what the prophets and Moses predicted would come to pass” (Acts 26:22). They also did not ask Caiaphas for ordination. In the same way today, in the Evangelical churches we correctly appeal to the doctrinal succession over a local and personal succession. We ask for neither ordination nor confirmation from the Roman pontiffs, who boast of succession from the apostles but are actually imitating Caiaphas.

Bellarmine makes the exception: “The Aaronic priesthood was temporal and lasted only until the beginning of the New Testament. Then there finally began a priesthood after the order of Melchizedek, which Christ Himself instituted. Because the apostles were the firstfruit of that priesthood, they were not supposed to have been the successors of Caiaphas but to be the beginning of a new priesthood.”

We respond. (1) Bellarmine himself admits, De eccles., bk. 4, ch. 7, § in omni: “Christ’s church was not a new church but only a change of the condition of the church.” But if only the external condition of the church is changed when the succession has been changed, and no new church is established, then succession is not a true and essential mark but only an accidental mark of the church, since it belongs only to the external condition of the church and not to its essence.

(2) As Christ was able to be a priest according to the order of Melchizedek—that is, Melchizedek’s successor—even though that succession had been interrupted over the course of several centuries, so also those can be the successors of the apostles who profess the pure and uncorrupted doctrine of the apostles, even though there may be an interruption with regard to time, places, and persons.

(3) It was foretold in the Old Testament that the Aaronic priesthood would end, for which reason the apostles were acting correctly when they separated themselves from Caiaphas and the Levitical priesthood. In the same way, it has been prophesied in the New Testament that “the Antichrist will sit in the temple of God” (2 Thess. 2:4); that false teachers will succeed the apostles and apostolic men and will mislead the church (Acts 20:29); that there will come a time when people will have to come out of the mystical “Babylon” (Rev. 18:4).

(4) He has not yet proved that Christ instituted in the Roman church the same sort of succession on the apostolic throne of Peter, about which the Papists boast, as God instituted in the church of Israel on the throne and seat of Aaron. Indeed, in Christ’s church we should no longer look for a carnal, local, and earthly succession but a doctrinal and spiritual succession, for His “kingdom is not of this world” (John 18:36).

(5) One can by no means say that, as the sons and descendants of Aaron succeeded him in the Levitical priesthood, so the apostles succeeded Christ in the priesthood according to Melchizedek because, as the Epistle to the Hebrews explains (7:24), Christ has an ἀπαράβατον ἱερωσύνην, “a priesthood that does not pass over to others.” Consequently, Christ did not admit the apostles into the fellowship of this priesthood of His but placed them in charge of His church as its teachers.

(6) Bellarmine adds: “Just as there were no true priests from Aaron until Christ except those who succeeded Aaron, so also there will not be any true priests from the apostles until the end of the world except those who succeed the apostles.” If this means a doctrinal succession, we concede it. If it means a local and personal succession, we deny it. The truth of the apostolic doctrine is not bound to an external throne and a succession on that throne. Rather, one who holds the doctrine of the apostles must be judged to be a true successor of the apostles.

(7) In fact, because not even in the Old Testament was the truth and integrity of Moses’ doctrine bound to the throne of the Aaronic priesthood, it is even less true in the New Testament to say in regard to the Roman throne and see that the truth and integrity of apostolic doctrine depend only on them. The antecedent is obvious because the Levitical priests sometimes followed idolatry. As a result, God also raised up prophets, restorers, and reformers of divine worship. Although they could not boast of an external, local succession on the throne of Moses or Aaron, nevertheless they were true teachers and true successors of Moses and Aaron in the office of teaching.

(8) Therefore we conclude with the words of Lyra, on Matthew 16: “The church does not consist of people with regard to power or office, whether ecclesiastical or secular, because many princes and chief priests and other lesser people have been discovered to have fallen away from the faith. For this reason, the church consists of those persons in whom there is the true knowledge and the confession of faith and truth.”

Second, it does not apply to the church alone

(II) Whatever does not apply only to the true church cannot be its proper mark. Succession does not apply to the true church alone. Therefore it is not its proper mark.

The minor premise can be proved with various examples. At the time of Christ, the synagogue of the Jews had a succession of priests that it could trace back to Aaron himself. Yet purity of doctrine was not always tied to that succession. Nicephorus, Hist. eccles., bk. 2, ch. 4:

Aaron was anointed the first high priest by his brother, Moses. So Aaron was first. Second was Eleazar; third, Phinehas; fourth, Eliezer; fifth, Bochchi; sixth, Uzzah; seventh, Eli; eighth, Achitob; ninth, Abimelech; tenth, Abiathar; eleventh, Zadoc. He was succeeded by Achimaas. Thirteenth was Azariah. Joram followed him, and then came Jehoiada. In order there then followed Axiora, Phadaeus, Sudaeus, Iculus. Twentieth was Joatham. He was followed by Urias, Neri, Joas, Selam, Chelcias. After these came Sorias, Josedech, and Jesus the son of Josedech. Joachim succeeded him. Thirtieth was Eliaseph. Then there were Joachaz, John Jadaeus, Onias, Simon, Eleazar, Manasses, Onias, and Simon. Fortieth was Onias, then Jesus and another Onias and Alcimus. After him came Onias the son of Onias. After him the forty-fourth was Judas Maccabaeus of the sons of Asamonaeus. He was then followed in order by his brother Jonathas and his brother Simon and by John, who was also called Hircanus. Then came Aristobolus, Jannaeus, who also had the name Alexander. Fiftieth was Hircanus; the fifty-first, Antigonus; fifty-second, Anaelus; fifty-third, Aristobolus, whom Herod substituted for Anaelus, who was rejected. He again restored Anaelus when Aristobolus was slain. Jesus the son of Phabus succeeded Anaelus. Then Herod’s father-in-law Simon became the priest. After him came Matthias, then Joseph, whom Jozar succeeded. Sixtieth was Eleazar, who was followed in order by Jesus the son of Sea; Annas, father-in-law of Caiaphas; Ishmael the son of Phabus; Eleazar the son of Annas; Simon the son of Camythus. Sixty-seventh was Caiaphas, who was also called Joseph, under whom our Lord died His saving death for us. He was followed by Jonathas the son of Annas, then his brother Matthias, and then Elinaeus, and another Joseph the son of Cama. He was succeeded by Jesus the son of Gamaliel, and then Matthias the son of Theophilus. Last of all was Phinaeus, under whom the city, the temple, and the entire nation were captured by Titus, and all the things of the temple and of the Law were completely destroyed, and everything was brought to ruins.

Tell me, please, what can be demonstrated in the succession of the Roman bishops that cannot be demonstrated in this succession of the Jewish high priests? In fact, the succession of high priests in the Old Testament was based upon a divine command and promise, neither of which can be shown from the Scriptures with regard to the Roman succession. Therefore just as various corruptions, superstitions, and errors crept into the public ministry of the church of Israel, especially in its latter days, despite that succession of high priests [pontificum], so also, despite the succession of pontiffs [pontificum], the same evils have crept into the Roman church, especially in these latter days.

And lest Bellarmine be able to make the exception that “the nature of the Jewish synagogue is different than that of the Christian church” (though elsewhere he himself has been accustomed to argue from the Israelite to the Christian church), we point out that the succession in the New Testament that reached all the way back to the apostles belongs to other churches, too, besides the Roman church, which they boast is the only true and catholic church. Irenaeus, bishop of Lyons, bk. 3, ch. 3, p. 170: “We have to list those whom the apostles established as bishops in the churches and their successors until us.” And a little later: “It is extremely long to list the successions of all the churches.” Nicephorus (Hist. eccl., bk. 3, ch. 1), after listing the successors of Peter in the Roman church, adds:

In the church at Alexandria the first man to hold the episcopacy after the evangelist Mark was Anianus, after whom came Abilius, who left it to his successor Cerdon. Evodius was the first to govern the church at Antioch after Peter and Luke. Ignatius was second, and his successor was Heros. James, the brother of the Lord, held the episcopacy at Jerusalem for thirty years. Simon, son of Cleophas, succeeded James after the destruction of Jerusalem. Third in order there was Justus. Also at this time Polycarp flourished at Smyrna in Asia Minor and was made bishop by John himself.

See also Eusebius, Hist. ecclesiastica, bks. 3ff. From all this, it is obvious that the apostolic succession thrived not only in the Roman church but also in other churches.

If Bellarmine wants to make the exception that “the succession died out in the other churches and endured only in the Roman church,” we bring forth the Greek church, which traces the succession of its bishops to the times of the apostles. Still enduring are those four patriarchates that church history mentions: Constantinople, Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. Of these, the patriarch of Antioch has his throne today in Damascus, and the patriarch of Alexandria has been moved to Cairo, the chief city of Egypt. The diocese of the patriarch of Constantinople extends over the broadest territory of all. Nicephorus (Hist. eccles., bk. 8, ch. 6) begins the list of bishops of Constantinople with “Andrew, the apostle of Christ.”

In more recent years, when Pope Gregory XIII tried to foist his calendar as well as his domination upon the Eastern Christians of Armenia, they responded by letter on the advice that they had communicated with the Eastern patriarchs that “we are not without a head, since we have always had a Catholicos, an archbishop, from the time of Constantine the Great and King Tiridates until this day.” Those who signed that letter were Patriarch Jeremias of Constantinople, Sylvester of Alexandria, Joachim of Antioch, and Gabriel of Justiniana Prima Archidarum. The letter was dated November 8, 1582 (Indict. 10). Willetus (De ecclesia, q. 3, not. 3, p. 81) mentions that authentic letters of Patriarch Jeremias of Constantinople, Meletius of Alexandria, Gabriel in the church of Thessalonica, etc., are extant, written to the English churches, in which letters they trace the succession of their bishops from the apostles.

Bellarmine makes the exception: (1) “The fathers did not call the church of Constantinople ‘apostolic.’ ”

We respond. It is certain that many churches were founded by the apostles in addition to the Roman church. Among them was also the church of Constantinople. Although those churches were not called “apostolic,” nevertheless they really were apostolic. Baronius (Annal., vol. 1, AD 44, sect. 12) declares: “The apostle Peter was the first to give bishops to the Byzantines and to other places of the same province.” Baronius confirms this from the letters of Pope Agapetus. Hence one cannot deny that the church of Constantinople is apostolic. Nicephorus teaches that it was founded by the apostle Andrew (Hist. eccles., bk. 8, ch. 6). We cannot prove with any suitable argument that he fabricated that succession, for he notes carefully the years of each bishop and takes his list all the way to Alexander, by whose requests Arius was removed. He counts twenty-three bishops from Andrew to Alexander. Also, all the histories testify that that province in which Byzantium was had been assigned to the apostle Andrew. Then, too, Nicephorus himself (bk. 1, ch. 1) testifies that he had faithfully written down the history of the church of Constantinople from “the trustworthy memorials of the ancients,” for he composed that volume at Constantinople where there was an excellent library in the Temple of St. Sophia, to which he had access.

(2) “The fathers of the First Council of Constantinople admit in a letter to Damasus, the Roman pontiff, that that church is new.”

We respond. They did not at all intend to say that that church had begun recently. Rather, previously, when it had been oppressed and almost destroyed by the Macedonian heretic, it was restored to its integrity with the substitution of Nectarius. Therefore they call it “new.” The word in Greek is νεοπαγής, because it was recently restored and renewed. But let us grant that “the succession of bishops in the church of Constantinople can be traced only from the time of Constantine.” We ask whether the church of Constantinople was true and orthodox. If this is conceded, as it cannot be denied, the consequence will be that neither is anything detrimental to our church, which does not have that external succession from the apostles, but that it is enough that with regard to doctrine it has fellowship with the catholic and apostolic church.

(3) “The argument from succession is used especially to prove that there is no church where there is no succession. Yet from this one cannot necessarily conclude that the church is there where a succession is.”

We respond. Drawing both affirmative and negative conclusions from something corresponds to a true and proper mark. You see, once what is proper to something is posited, the thing itself, to which it is proper, is also posited. So also, once what is proper to something is removed, the thing itself, to which it is proper, is also removed. But if one cannot draw an affirmative conclusion from succession to the verity of the church, then surely succession must not be a proper mark of the church.

Moreover, Bellarmine contradicts Costerus, Lessius, and other Papist writers who do draw an affirmative argument from succession. He is especially contradicting Baronius (Annal., vol. 1, AD 30, sect. 52), who says that succession has great strength “because, on the judgment of any person who has reason, one may consider it certain and sure that a legitimate temple—I say, the catholic church herself—is in that place where the succession of pontiffs has been legitimately preserved from its beginning.” In fact, Bellarmine even contradicts himself, for those testimonies that he cites from the fathers in favor of succession draw an affirmative conclusion.

(4) “That the church is not among the Greeks is proved not from their lack of succession but from the fact that three councils—of the Lateran, of Lyon, and of Florence—have said so.”

We respond. Although the Greek church is not without its errors, yet it is purer than the Roman church, as is clear from what has been said previously. There is an explanation elsewhere on what should be thought about those papal councils. Furthermore, if one cannot conclude anything against the Greek church from its lack of succession, then neither can anyone conclude anything against our church on the basis of the same principle. If Bellarmine says that we were condemned in the Council of Trent, we send him back to that excellent book that explains the reasons for rejecting the Council of Trent, the book published in 1584 by the noblemen of the empire who are devoted to the Augsburg Confession, against which book even the gates of hell do not prevail.

(5) “Over long periods of time those patriarchal churches had obvious heretics and, therefore, the succession of the ancient pastors was interrupted.”

We respond. We are ready to prove the very same thing about the Roman popes. Zephyrinus was a Montanist; Marcellinus, an idolater; Liberius, an Arian; Vigilius, a Eutychian; Honorius, a Monothelite; etc. The histories tell us, and Hotomanus in his Brutum fulmen reveals in detail, what sort of people the popes of more recent times have been.

Third, without doctrinal succession, it is not good for anything

(III) Where the doctrinal succession is not present, there the local succession is of no importance, though it may exist Therefore that local succession which lacks the doctrinal succession will be of no importance and, as a consequence, is not a mark of the church.

We prove the first of the premises from this foundation: The true church cannot be one that does not have the true, apostolic doctrine, since it is what might be called the “soul” of the church. Therefore local succession is not good for anything unless it has true doctrine connected to it. Some of our adversaries themselves acknowledge this, as we will show later.

The latter of the premises is confirmed:

(1) By the predictions of the apostles.

In Acts 20:29–30 Paul addresses the elders of the church at Ephesus in this way: “I know that after my departure fierce wolves will come in among you, not sparing the flock, and from your own selves will arise men speaking perverse things to draw away the disciples after them.” Here we have a clear prophecy that in the church at Ephesus false prophets and wicked misleaders would succeed the orthodox bishops, and the outcome proved this later. 1 Tim. [4]:1–3: “In the last times some will depart from the faith by giving heed to spirits of error and doctrines of demons, speaking lies in hypocrisy … who forbid marriage and who abstain from foods,” etc. Here the word κωλυόντων [“forbid”] shows that those false teachers will introduce celibacy and the distinction of foods into the church with some degree of power and authority. From this we understand that their successors will be people who will have authority and power in the church. 2 Pet. 2:1: “But there were also false prophets among the people, just as there will be false teachers among you, who will bring in sects of perdition.” Just as the priests who had the ordinary succession and sat on the throne of Aaron among the Israelites often degenerated into false prophets, so also the apostle foretells that the same thing is to be feared in the New Testament. The prophecy concerning the Antichrist (2 Thess. 2:4) especially belongs here: that he will sit “in the temple of God.” That is, he will usurp for himself the domination in the church on the pretext of succession from the apostles.

(2) By the examples of the histories.

In the church that Peter planted at Antioch, the orthodox bishops were succeeded by the heresiarch Paul of Samosata; Peter Gnaphaeus, a Eutychian; Macarius, a Monothelite; etc. In the church at Alexandria planted by the apostles and, as the ancients hand down to us, by Mark, their successors were Georgius and Lucius, Arians; Diascorus, a Eutychian; Cyrus, a Monothelite; etc. In the church at Constantinople, Andrew’s successors were the heresiarchs Macedonius, Nestorius, and Eutyches. Eusebius of Nicomedia, Eustathius, and other Arian bishops had the succession of places and sees after the apostles. We shall show later what sort of bishops succeeded in the church that Peter and Paul founded at Rome. Vincent of Lérins, Adv. haeres., ch. 34: “The old stream of foulness has flowed in a constant, secret succession from Simon Magus to the most recent Priscillian.” Bellarmine himself acknowledges that “the heresiarchs have almost all been either bishops or presbyters” (De Rom. pontific., bk. 1, ch. 8). “But those are not true bishops unless they have the succession from the apostles,” as he argues in this chapter. Therefore those who have the succession from the apostles can become heresiarchs.

From all of this, it is quite clear that local succession can be separated from doctrinal succession. Consequently, we can by no means draw an argument from local succession to the verity of the church, which cannot exist without doctrinal succession.The devout ancients confirm the same point. They attribute nothing to a bare personal and local succession that lacks purity of doctrine. Irenaeus, Adv. haer., bk. 4, ch. 43, p. 277:

We must obey those presbyters who are in the church; those who have the succession from the apostles; those who, as we have shown, received along with the succession of episcopacy the certain gift of truth according to the good pleasure of the Father. On the other hand, we must consider suspect all the rest, who depart from the principal succession and are gathered in any place at all. We should hold them either as heretical people of an evil opinion or as schismatics, puffed-up people who please themselves, or again as hypocrites, doing this for the sake of profit and vainglory. All these fall away from the truth. And the heretics, offering a strange fire at the altar of God, that is, strange doctrines, will be burned with heavenly fire, just like Nadab and Abihu.

Here Irenaeus acknowledges only those as true successors of the apostles who have received, along with the succession of the episcopacy, the certain gift of truth. He also teaches that those people who teach a new and corrupt doctrine depart from the principal succession, just as Nadab and Abihu indeed were successors of Aaron, but because they were offering a strange fire, they were consumed by the fire of God’s wrath. In the same book, ch. 44, p. 278: “It is necessary to follow those who guard the doctrine of the apostles and who, with the order of the presbytery, provide sound speech and behavior without offense.”

Tertullian, De praescript. adv. haeres.:

Even if heretics fabricate such a succession of bishops, their very doctrine, when compared with apostolic doctrine, will declare from its diversity and quantity that it does not belong to any apostle as its author, nor to any apostolic man. This is because, just as the apostles did not teach different things among themselves, so also apostolic men did not publish writings contrary to the apostles, except those people who revolted from the apostles and preached in a different manner.

Finally, he concludes: “We must consider the adulteration of Scripture and of its exposition to be located where a diversity of doctrine is found.” We say the same thing about papal dogmas, because a comparison of them with apostolic doctrine reveals that they do not come from any apostle or apostolic man. Page 102: “Those churches are the offshoots of apostolic churches. They preserve the handing down of faith and the seeds of doctrine.” Page 107: “Although some churches do not mention an apostle or apostolic man as their founder, as being much more recent, yet being unanimous in the same faith, they are considered no less apostolic on account of kinship of doctrine.” Ibid.: “If a bishop, if a deacon, if a widow, if a virgin, if a doctor, or even if a martyr has fallen away from the rule, will heresies, for that reason, seem to have the truth? Do we prove the faith on the basis of persons, or the persons on the basis of the faith?” The Papists try to prove the faith on the basis of persons, namely, on the basis of a personal succession of bishops, but we say that the persons must be proved on the basis of their faith.

Bishop Claudius Taurinensis:

“I say that that person is apostolic not who holds the throne of the apostles, but rather who embraces the office and doctrine of the apostles. After all, Pharisees, scribes, and all kinds of wicked hypocrites occupied the throne of Moses, the best prophet, though they did not at all teach the true commandments of Moses from that place.”

Epiphanius, Haeres. 55:

“The succession of doctrine is to be sought, not the succession of persons.”

Nazianzen, Orat. de laud. Athanasii, vol. 2, p. 502, writes:

“Athanasius succeeded Mark and was selected by the approval of all the people.”

Then he adds: “He had a greater succession of piety and faith than of place and dignity because he was not the immediate successor of Mark, if we consider place, but came after a long interval of time. If we consider faith, however, he was his immediate successor, and this, only, is the true succession.” These are his words:

οὐχ ἧττον τῆς εὐσεβείας ἢ προεδρίας αὐτοῦ διάδοχος· τῇ μὲν γὰρ πολλοστὸς ἀπʼ ἐκείνου, τῇ δὲ εὐθὺς μετʼ ἐκείνου εὑρίσκεται, ἣν δὴ καὶ κυρίως ὑποληπτέον διαδοχὴν, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὁμόγνωμον καὶ ὁμόθρονον, τὸ δὲ ἀντίδοξον καὶ ἀντίθρονον, καὶ ἡ μὲν προσηγορίαν, ἡ δὲ ἀλήθειαν ἔχει διαδοχῆς. That is,] he was a successor no less of piety than of the primary chair. If you consider the latter, he will be very far away from him. If you have regard to the former, he will be found right next to him. This is what must properly be considered the succession, for the man who professes the same doctrine of faith is also a sharer of the same throne. The man who embraces a contrary faith ought to be considered an adversary on the throne. Yet the latter has the title of succession, while the former has the reality and truth of succession, etc.

“We should not consider him a successor who breaks in by force, but him who has endured such force; nor should we consider him a successor who defends a contrary opinion, but him who is of the same opinion, unless perhaps he is called a ‘successor’ in the same way as we say that illness succeeds health, darkness succeeds light, storms succeed tranquility, and madness succeeds wisdom.”

Eusebius (Hist. eccles., bk. 5, ch. 6) lists the succession of the bishops of Rome but adds clearly: “They kept the form of apostolic preaching and protected unharmed and uninjured the same preaching of the divine faith that the apostles handed down.”

Ambrose, De poenit., bk. 1, ch. 6, vol. 1, p. 156: “Those who do not have the faith of Peter do not have the inheritance of Peter.”

Jerome, Letter 1 ad Heliodor.: “It is not easy to stand in the place of Peter and Paul and to hold the throne of those who rule with Christ, because it is said concerning this: ‘The sons of the saints are not those who hold the places of the saints, but those who do their works.’ ”

Chrysostom, or the author of the Opus imperf., homily 43 on Matthew 23: “The throne does not make the priest, but the priest makes the throne. The place does not sanctify the man; but the man, the place. He who sits well upon his throne will receive honor from it. He who sits badly does harm to the throne. A bad priest gets accusation, not dignity, from his priesthood.”

Augustine, De unit. ecclesiae, ch. 4: “Those who disagree with the Holy Scriptures, even though they be found in all places where the church is designated, are not of the church.” Chapter 16: “We do not wish to prove our church from the succession of bishops nor from the authority of councils nor from the frequency of miracles nor from dreams and visions. All such things that happen in the catholic church must be proved for this reason, because they happen in her; they do not, therefore, prove her. The Lord Jesus Himself, when He rose from the dead, sent His disciples back to the Scriptures of the Law and the prophets.” On John, tractate 46: “You must listen to those who are seated upon the throne, for by sitting upon the throne they are teaching the Law of God. Therefore God teaches through them. But if they are teaching their own things, do not listen, do not do.”

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Taken and adapted from: On the Church, Theological Commonplaces, by Johann Gerhard

The Authority of Scripture in Lutheran Theology

We believe what the Holy Scriptures declare, simply because they declare it, and it is they that beget faith in us, and they are the only source from which we derive our faith. They are, at the same time, the only inspired book, and by this they are distinguished from all other writings. It is therefore only from them that we can learn what is true in divine things, and they furnish the means by which we can everywhere distinguish between truth and error.

The authority of Holy Scripture is, accordingly, divided into: “(a) Causative authority, by which the Scriptures create and confirm in the mind of man assent to the truths to be believed. (b) Normative or canonical authority, by which authentic Scripture is distinguished from other writings and versions, and that which is true from that which is false.” [2] HOLL. (104.)

(a) Causative Authority. This rests upon the fact, that we acknowledge God as the author of the Holy Scriptures, [3] and this we prove by the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. [4] The proofs of inspiration are, it is true, derived in the first instance only from the Holy Scriptures, and already presuppose faith in the Holy Scriptures themselves, on the part of those who admit them as evidence. But, for the Church and her members, there is no need of proof for the inspiration of Scripture, for her very existence depends upon this faith, and this faith precedes all proofs; [5] without this, no article of faith could be based upon the Holy Scriptures. [6]

Therefore, the proof that the Holy Scriptures are inspired, or, what amounts to the same thing, that they are of divine origin, and consequently possess full authority in matters of faith, is required only for those who are yet without the Church, or who, if within her pale, are not confirmed in the faith. But it lies in the nature of the case, that no proof can be given to those, which they cannot, in an unbelieving frame of mind, evade; for the only absolutely stringent proof lies in the fact, that the Holy Spirit bears witness in the heart of each individual, and thus convinces him of the divinity of the Word of God, by the mighty influence which it exerts upon him; [7] but that this may be the case, it is necessary that the individual do not resist the drawings of the Holy Spirit, and before this takes place the testimony of the Holy Spirit can have no probative power for him. [8]

To this experience, therefore, the individual is referred, and through it alone will he attain to absolute certainty in regard to the divinity of the Holy Scriptures. All other so-called proofs are rather to be considered as such evidences for the divinity of the Holy Scriptures as can make this probable to the individual, and invite him to give himself up to the influence of the Holy Spirit, in order to acquire for himself the same experience which the Church has gained. [9] Such evidences are of two kinds. The Holy Scriptures themselves testify in regard to this divinity, by their internal excellence and dignity (κριτηρια interna, internal proofs); and the effects which the Holy Scriptures have produced upon others, testify also to the same (κριτηρια externa, external proofs). [10] These evidences the Church holds out to each individual, and seeks by their means to induce him to yield his heart to the influence of the Holy Spirit, who will produce in him the full conviction of the divinity of the Holy Scriptures. [11]

(b) Normative or Canonical Authority. HOLL. (125): “The canonical authority of Scripture is its supreme dignity, by which, in virtue of its meaning, as well as of its divinely inspired style, it is the infallible and sufficient rule, by which all that is to be believed and done by man in order to secure eternal salvation, must be examined, all controversies in regard to matters of faith decided, and all other writings adjudged.” [12] Accordingly, we must acknowledge the Holy Scriptures as the only rule and guide of our life, by which alone all controversies in regard to divine things must be settled, [13] so that in no case is the addition of any other authority required, by which they may be decided. [14]

But if the Holy Scriptures are thus the only judge of controversies, the question arises: How is this decision to be obtained from them? It lies in the nature of the case, that not every one can accomplish this with equal success, for certain previous conditions are required for this purpose, without which the Holy Scriptures cannot be understood and expounded; and besides, necessary ecclesiastical order demands that, at least for the public investigation and announcement of the decisions contained in the Holy Scriptures, there should be a regular calling. Hence, it pre-eminently belongs to the Church publicly to make known, by means of her representatives (the clergy), the decision discovered in the Holy Scriptures, in reference to a contested point, [15] whence, however, it does not yet follow, that every private individual within the pale of the Church does not possess the right of private judgment. [16] If then, in any given case, the adjustment of a controversy be not attained, the fault lies not in the Holy Scriptures, but in the fact that the Holy Scriptures were not properly interpreted, or the proper interpretation was not adopted. [17] But, in every case, when such a controversy is to be decided, resort must be had to the original text of the Holy Scriptures; for, although a good translation may enable us to secure the testimony of the Holy Spirit, it is never so accurate, that we dare employ it in doubtful cases, in which often everything depends upon the most accurate investigation of the single words of the original text. [18]

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Notes & Sources

[1] The attributes are variously enumerated by the early divines. CAL. and QUEN. add to those we have mentioned, infallible truth, the power of interpreting itself, normative and judicial authority, which are again by others incorporated in those we have mentioned.

Some theologians also add the following as secondary attributes: (1) “Necessity; or, that it was necessary for the Word of God to be committed to writing, in order to preserve the purity of the heavenly doctrine. (2) Integrity and perpetuity; or, that the Holy Scriptures have been preserved entire, and will be thus perpetually preserved. (3) Purity and uncorrupted state of its sources; or, that the Hebrew text in the Old Testament, and the Greek in the New, have not suffered, in all copies, any corruption, either through malice or carelessness, but have been preserved by Divine Providence, free from all corruption. (4) Authentic dignity; or, that the Hebrew text alone of the Old Testament, and the Greek of the New, is to be regarded as authentic, nor is any version to be counted worthy of such supreme authority. (5) The liberty of all to read for themselves.” — CAL., I, 450.

[2] BR. (82): “The authority of Scripture, so far as it regards 54the assent that is to be yielded to its declarations, may be viewed in a two-fold light: first, in a strict sense, in order to cause assent to the things that are to be believed, which right the Scriptures hold because they are the source of knowledge and the formal object of faith and revealed theology; secondly, in order to distinguish by the inspired Scriptures themselves, both the true Scriptures and those other teachings, which relate to matters of faith and practice; and this right they hold, inasmuch as they are canonical, or the rule and guide whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood. . . . For, although the authority of Scripture is one and the same, based upon the veracity of God and the dependence of the Scriptures upon God, through which it is appointed, both in a formal sense to produce faith and in a normal sense to examine and decide between certain Scriptures and other teachings; and as, further, the Scriptures are to be employed somewhat differently for the formal purpose of causing assent to the faith, and for the normal purpose of distinguishing truth from falsehood; thus, also, we must by all means treat distinctly of both these methods in discussing the authority of Scripture.”

—HOLL. (105): “In the former method, they (the Holy Scriptures) are employed in every language for producing faith in the mind of an unbelieving man, and for confirming it in the mind of a believer; in which respect this authority is called causative or promotive of faith; in the latter method, they are employed only in the original text, to distinguish from the actually inspired Scripture the versions of the Hebrew and Greek originals, the Symbolical Books, and all writings that treat of matters of faith and practice.”

[3] BR. (80): “The authority of Scripture, viewed in itself and absolutely, or with reference to its contents, depends upon God, the sole Author of Scripture, and results from His veracity and great and infinite power.”

—GRH. (II, 36): “Inasmuch, then, as the Holy Scriptures have God for their author, by whose immediate inspiration the prophets, evangelists, and apostles wrote, therefore they also possess divine authority; because they are inspired, they are in like manner self-commendatory, winning faith by virtue of their own inherent excellence.”

[4] BR. (81): “So far as we are concerned, or that we may be convinced that the Holy Scriptures are worthy to receive faith and obedience, not only these perfections of God must be known, but also the dependence of Scripture upon God, or its inspiration by Him.” Our conviction, however, rests upon the two theses: “(1) Whatsoever Scripture is recorded by divine inspiration, that is certainly and infallibly true. (2) The Holy Scriptures were recorded by divine inspiration.”

[5] GRH. (I, 9): “Those who are within the Church do not inquire about the authority of Scripture, for this is their starting-point. How can they be true disciples of Christ if they pretend to call in question the doctrine of Christ? How can they be true members of the Church if they are in doubt concerning the foundation of the Church? How can they wish to prove that to themselves which they always employ to prove other things? How can they doubt concerning that whose efficacy they have experienced in their own hearts? The Holy Spirit testifies in their hearts that the Spirit is truth, i.e., that the doctrine derived from the Holy Spirit is absolute truth.”

[6] GRH. therefore very properly observes, that the doctrine of the authority of Scripture is no article of faith, but rather the fountain-head of the articles of faith. (I, 11): “The doctrine concerning the Canon is, properly speaking, not an article of faith, since Moses, the prophets, evangelists, and apostles did not fabricate in their writings a new article of faith superadded to the former, which they taught orally.”

[7] GRH. (II, 37): “The first (testimony) is the internal witness of the Holy Spirit, who, as He bears witness to the spirit of believers that they are the sons of God, Rom. 8:16, so, also, efficaciously convinces them, that in the Scriptures the voice of their Heavenly Father is contained; and God is the only fit and authentic witness. To this testimony belongs the lively sense of the godly in daily prayer and in the exercises of penitence and faith, the grace of consoling and strengthening the mind against all kinds of adversities, temptations, persecutions, etc., etc., which the godly daily experience in reading and meditating upon Scripture.”

—QUEN. (I, 97): “The ultimate reason by and through which we are led to believe with a divine and unshaken faith that God’s Word is God’s Word, is the intrinsic power and efficacy of that Word itself, and the testimony and seal of the Holy Spirit, speaking in and through Scripture. Because the bestowment of faith, not only that by which we believe in the articles, but even that by which we believe in the Scriptures, that exhibit and propose the articles, is a work that emanates from the Holy Spirit, or the Supreme Cause.”

—HOLL. (116): “By the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit, is here understood the supernatural act of the Holy Spirit through the Word of God, attentively read or heard (His own divine power being communicated to the Holy Scriptures), moving, opening, illuminating the heart of man, and inciting it to obedience unto 56the faith; so that man, thus illuminated by internal, spiritual influences, clearly perceives that the word proposed to him has indeed proceeded from God, and thus gives it unyielding assent.” The Scripture proof for the testimony of the Holy Spirit is deduced from 1 John 5:6; 1 Thess. 1:5,6; 2:13.

To the common objection, that Theology here reasons in a circle, the following answer is returned, HOLL. (119): “If I inquire, says the objector, How do you know that the Scriptures are divine? the Lutherans answer: ‘Because the Holy Spirit in each one testifies and confirms this by the Scripture.’ If I ask again: ‘How do you prove that this Holy Spirit is divine?’ the same persons will reply: ‘Because the Scriptures testify that He is divine, and His testimony infallible.’ To all of which we reply: We must distinguish between a sophistical circle and a demonstrative retrogression. In reasoning in a circle, one unknown thing is employed to prove another equally unknown; but in a demonstrative retrogression, we proceed from confused knowledge to that which is distinct. For the divine dignity of Scripture is proved by the supernatural effect of the Holy Spirit operating efficaciously through the Scriptures, illuminating, converting, regenerating, renewing. But, if you ask whether that spirit is divine or malignant, then we reason from the effect, which is divine and salutary, that the Spirit, who bears witness within concerning the divine origin of the Holy Scriptures, is divine, most holy, and excellent.”

—QUEN. (I, 101) further adds: “The Papists, therefore, wrongly accuse us of reasoning in a circle, when we prove the Holy Scriptures from the testimony of the Holy Spirit, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit from the Holy Scriptures. Else would it be also reasoning in a circle when Moses and the prophets testify concerning Christ, and Christ concerning Moses and the prophets; or, when John the Baptist testifies that Christ is the Messiah, and again Christ that John the Baptist is a prophet.”

[8] Therefore GRH. (II, 36) distinguishes, among those who stand without the pale of the Church, two classes: “Some are curable, who come with minds tempered and desirous of learning; others are incurable, who come with minds unyielding and obstinate, and who contumaciously resist the truth, Acts 13:46; 19:28. The incurable, just as those who are past bodily recovery, are to be forsaken to their fate, Titus 3:10. The same applies to those who are within the pale of the Church, if, in the midst of temptation, they begin to doubt the authority of the Scripture.”

[9] QUEN. (I, 98): “Those arguments both of an internal and external nature, by which we are led to the belief of the authority 57of Scripture make the inspiration of Scripture probable, and produce a certainty not merely conjectural but moral, so that to call it in question were the work of a fool; but they do not make the divinity of Scripture infallible, and place it beyond all doubt, nor do they produce within the mind an immovable conviction, i.e., they beget not a divine, but merely a human faith, not an unshaken certainty, but a credibility, or a very probable opinion.”

[10] GRH. (II, 37): “I. The internal criteria inherent in the Scriptures themselves, some of which are found in the causes, others in the effects, some in the subject-matter, others in incidental circumstances. Such criteria are antiquity, the majesty of the subjects discussed, peculiarity of style, harmony of all parts, dignity of the predictions concerning future events, the reality of their fulfilment, divinity of the miracles by which their doctrine is confirmed, the violence of the diabolical opposition to it, the efficacy of Scripture itself in persuading and moving to action. II. The external testimonies (which can be drawn from all classes of men), among which is pre-eminent the testimony of the Church, to which we may add that of the martyrs, who sealed the doctrine taught in Scripture with their blood, and also, the punishment of blasphemers and persecutors, who contumaciously opposed this doctrine.”

The later divines present these proofs in substantially the same manner as HOLL. (106): “The external criteria (which are derived, not from Scripture, but from other sources) are (a) the antiquity of Scripture; (b) the singular clearness of the sacred writers, their desire after knowledge and truth; (c) the splendor of the miracles by which the heavenly doctrine is confirmed; (d) the harmonious testimony of the Church, spread over the whole earth, to the divinity of the Holy Scriptures; (e) the constancy of the martyrs; (f) the testimony of other nations to the doctrine contained in the Holy Scriptures; (g) the successful and rapid propagation of the Christian doctrine through the whole world, and its wonderful preservation during so many persecutions; (h) the extremely severe punishments inflicted upon the despisers and persecutors of the Divine Word.” In reference to these, HOLL. remarks (109): “We premise these external criteria, in order to prepare the minds of the unbelieving for reading and meditating upon the Holy Scriptures with interest and desire . . . it is necessary that first of all unbelievers be led by external criteria to regard it as not improbable that the Holy Scriptures had their origin in God, and therefore begin to respect, read, and meditate upon them.”

The internal criteria (“drawn from the intrinsic nature and attributes of Scripture,” BR.) are: “(a) the majesty of God, testifying 58concerning Himself in the Holy Scriptures; (b) the simplicity and dignity of the biblical style; (c) the sublimity of the divine mysteries which the Scriptures reveal; (d) the truth of all biblical assertions; (e) the sanctity of the precepts contained in the Holy Scriptures; (f) the sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures to salvation.” In regard to these, HOLL. further adds: “These internal criteria, taken together and conjointly, constitute a stronger argument than if taken successively or singly.”

[11] GRH. (I, 9): “Although the testimony of the Holy Spirit is of the very highest importance, yet we are not to make a beginning with it in the conversion of such men, i.e., they are not to be commanded to wait until the Holy Spirit bears witness immediately in their hearts concerning the authority of Scripture, but they are to be directed to the testimony of the Church, which, in this respect, performs the part of a preceptor to the unbelieving disciple. Just as, therefore, it is necessary for a pupil first to believe, until he afterwards becomes able to form an independent judgment concerning the things taught, so it is necessary for an unbeliever to yield assent to the testimony of the Church, which is the first step towards ascertaining the authority of Scripture; then the internal criteria of antiquity, prophecies, etc., are to be added. Yet the testimony of the Church alone is not sufficient to convince an unbeliever of the divine authority of the Scriptures, since he may, perhaps, still be in doubt whether this be really the true Church of God. Wherefore, as it is the duty of the preceptor, not only to propose precepts, but also to corroborate their truth; so it is not sufficient for the Church to declare that these are divine Scriptures, unless it accompany its declaration with reasons. Then at length it may follow that the Holy Spirit shall bear testimony in the heart of the inquirer, and prove the truth of His words.”

The testimony of the Church varies in weight, according as it is derived from the earlier or from the later Church. GRH. (I, 10): “The primitive Church, that heard the apostles themselves, excelled in being the original recipients of the sacred books, and in being favored with the living instruction of the apostles and with a number of miracles to prove the authority of the canon; the next age, in which the autographs of the apostles were still preserved, excelled the former in the more complete fulfilment of New Testament prophecies, in the abundance of versions of both Testaments into various languages, and in the testimony concerning the Holy Scriptures extracted from various writings of believers; and it excelled the age succeeding it, by possessing the autographs of the evangelists and apostles, the voice of the ancient Church, and a number 59of miracles. The latest age of the Church excels both the others (although the autographs of the apostles are no more), at least in the more perfect fulfilment of prophecy.”

Occasion is here taken to protest against the Romish axiom, “All the authority of Scripture depends upon the Church,” and to guard against such an interpretation being put upon what has been above stated.

—HOLL. (120): “The authority of the Holy Scriptures neither depends upon the Church of the divine, pre-eminent dignity in which its power lies; nor, in order that it may be known, does it need the testimony of the Church either, as the grand and ultimate source of proof for the divine authority of Scripture, or as the only and absolutely necessary arguments.”

—GRH. (II, 38) remarks (1): “It is one thing for the Church to bear witness to the Scriptures and their authority ministerially, and another to confer upon Scripture its authority dictatorially and judicially. From the ministry and testimony of the Church, we are led to acknowledge the authority of Scripture, but from this it by no means follows that the authority of Scripture, either in itself, or in respect to us, depends alone upon the authority of the Church; because, when we have once learned that the Scriptures are divine and contain the Word of God, we no longer believe the Scriptures on account of the Church, but on account of themselves; because, viz., they are the voice of God, which is αυταλεθεια, and hence αυτοπιστος, which we know must be believed on its own account and immediately. (2) It is one thing for us to become acquainted with the authority of the Scriptures by the testimony of the Church, and another, for the whole authority of the Scripture, so far as we are concerned, to depend solely upon the testimony of the Church. The former we concede, the latter we deny; because, besides the testimony of the Church, we have two other classes of evidence for the authority of Scripture, and in the same class, that embraces the testimony of the Church, other external evidences derived from all kinds of men may be adduced; yet, at the same time, we do not deny, that the testimony of the Church is to be preferred to all others in this class. (3) It is one thing to speak of the testimony of the primitive Church, which received the autograph of the sacred books from the apostles, and handed down a credible testimony concerning them to posterity, and another, to speak of the authority of the present Church.”

—QUEN. (I, 93) notices, in addition, the objection of the Papists, “The Church is more ancient than the Scriptures; therefore, it has greater authority;” to which he replies: “We must make a distinction between the Word of God contained in the Scriptures, and the act of writing itself, or, between the substance of Scripture, 60which is the Word of God, and its accident, which is the writing of it. The Church is prior to the Scriptures, if you regard the mere act of writing; but it is not prior to the Word of God itself, by means of which the Church itself was collected. Surely the Scriptures, or the Word of God, is the foundation of the Church, Eph. 2:20; but the foundation is older than the building.”

[12] HOLL. (125): “The Holy Scriptures exercise their highest canonical authority, when a controversy arises concerning the truth of a doctrine, and the truth is to be confirmed and falsehood to be confuted; but the Scriptures exert their faith-producing authority, as often as the unbelieving are to be converted to the Christian faith, or the weak faith of believers is to be strengthened.”

[13] GRH. (I, 28): “The Holy Scriptures are the rule of our faith and life; therefore, also, the judge of theological controversies.” (I, 30): “Add to this, that all the qualities of a rule, properly so called, belong to Scripture. For a rule should be certain, fixed, invariable, fundamental, suited to meet every case, always self-consistent. But these qualities belong neither to tradition, nor to the teachings of human reason, nor to the writings of the fathers, nor to the Pope, nor to the decrees of councils, but to the Holy Scriptures alone.”

—FORM. CONC. (Preface, 1): “We teach, that the only rule according to which all doctrines and all teachers are to be estimated and judged, is none other than the prophetic and apostolic writings of the Old and New Testament.”

—QUEN. (I, 150): “When we say that the Holy Scriptures are the only rule of faith and of life conformed to the will of God, we do not speak of every age of the Church, for there was a time when the Church was instituted and governed without the written Word of God, the time, viz., before Moses; but we refer to that age in which the first written canon was prepared, and especially to the New Testament times, in which all things necessary to faith and the worship of God have been written down, and with great care collected into the canon.”

—HOLL. (125): “As a rule of knowledge, it performs a two-fold function, directive and corrective. For it directs the thoughts of the human mind, so that they abide within the bounds of truth; and it corrects errors, inasmuch as it is properly its own rule of right and wrong. Wherefore, the Holy Scriptures are called the Canon, or rule, partly on account of their directive character, because the true faith and pure morals are learned from them; partly on account of their corrective character, since controversies in regard to the faith are decided by them, and whatever is right and godly is retained, and what is erroneous and ungodly is rejected.”

Others, as CAL. and QUEN., express this by a separate attribute, viz., the normative and judicial authority. CAL. (I, 474): “The Holy Scriptures are a rule, according to which all controversies in regard to faith or life in the Church should, and can be, decided (Ps. 19:7; Gal. 6:16; Phil. 3:16); and as a rule they are not partial, but complete and adequate, because, beside the Scriptures, no other infallible rule in matters of faith can be given. All others beside the Word of God are fallible; and on this account we are referred to the Holy Scriptures as the only rule (Deut. 4:2; 12:28; Josh. 23:6; Is. 8:20; Luke 16:29; 2 Pet. 1:19); to which, alone, Christ and the apostles referred as a rule (Matt. 4:4; 22:29,31; Mark 9:12; John 5:45; Acts 3:20; 13:33; 18:28; 26:22).”

[14] Hence, the two corollaries of QUEN. (I, 158, 167): “(1) It is therefore not necessary that there should be in the Church a supreme, regularly appointed and universal judge, who, seated upon a visible throne, is peremptorily to decide all strifes and controversies that arise among Christians concerning faith and religion, and orally and specifically to pronounce sentence in regard to them. We cannot acknowledge as such a judge either the Roman pontiff, or the fathers, or councils. (2) Nor is the decision concerning the mysteries and controversies of the faith to be granted to human reason, nor to an internal instinct or secret spirit.”

[15] CHMN. (Trid.): “The Church has the right and liberty of deciding.” GRH. (II, 359): “If the Church is ‘the pillar and the ground of the truth,’ and we are ‘commanded to hear it’ (1 Tim. 3:15; Matt. 18:17), then all decisions in matters of faith belong to her.”

But the right which is hereby ascribed to the Church is carefully distinguished from that which belongs to the Holy Scriptures. This is usually done in the following manner: (1) The principal judge is the Holy Spirit; the instrumental judge, the Holy Scriptures; the ministerial (inferior) judge, the clergy. In regard to the latter, however (“whose duty it is to seek for the decision of the Supreme Judge as laid down in Scripture, and from this to teach what is to be done, to interpret this, and decide in accordance with it”), it is maintained ‘that this judge should not pronounce sentence according to his own will, but according to the rule laid down by the Supreme Judge,’ i.e., according to the Holy Scriptures, which we therefore call the decision of the Supreme Judge, the rule of the inferior judge, and the directive judge (GRH., II., 366).

—QUEN. (I, 150): “An inferior decision, viz., of a teacher 62of the Church, is nothing else than the interpretation, declaration, or annunciation of a divine, decisive, and definitive judgment, and its application to particular persons and things.” Whence it further follows: “We are able to decide by the decision of an inferior judge, not absolutely, but if he pronounce according to the prescriptions of the divine law or the Scriptures, and in so far as he shows that he decides according to the Word of God. (Deut. 17:10.) Wherefore, we may appeal from this inferior judge to the Supreme, but not conversely, from the Supreme to the inferior. The subordinate judge is, therefore, not absolute, but restricted and bound by the decisions of the Supreme Judge as recorded in Scripture. According to this distinction, the Holy Scriptures are called the judging Judge, or the Judge ad quem (to whom there is appeal), and the Church the Judge to be judged, or the Judge a quo (From whom there is an appeal).”

The Church is, therefore, it is true, a visible judge, but merely discretive, who, in the exercise of sound judgment, distinguishes truth from falsehood. She is, however, “not a judge, specially and strictly so called, viz., authoritative and decisive, pronouncing sentence authoritatively, and by virtue of the authority belonging to her, compelling the disputants to acquiesce in the whole opinion she may propose without further investigation.” (HOLL., 146.)

[16] GRH. (II, 359): “Whatever pertains to a spiritual person, may be regarded as belonging to all children and members of the Church. The reason of this is, that by spiritual person, we understand not merely the clergy, according to the nomenclature of the Papists, but all the children of the Church, who are controlled by the Spirit of God. Rom. 8:9. For ‘he that is spiritual judgeth all things.’ 1 Cor. 2:15.”

—QUEN. (I, 150): “We assert that every believer, according to the measure of the gift of God, can and ought to judge, not indeed, in all controversies, but concerning the doctrines necessary to salvation, and to mark the difference between brass and beans by his own discretive judgment. Not that every one should follow his own notions, as the Papists accuse our churches of doing, but that he should submit himself to the judgment of the Holy Spirit, recorded in the Scriptures, and examine all things according to the tenor of this decision, but leave to the learned the public decision of controversies. 1 Cor. 10:15; 11:31: 1 Thess. 5:19.”

In accordance with this, a distinction is made between “the public and the private ministerial (inferior) judge. The public judge is the clergy; the private, each member of the Church, or private person.”

[17] GRH. (II, 367): “We must distinguish between power and its exercise. The Holy Scriptures are indeed sufficient and adapted, by virtue of their authority, and the perfection and perspicuity of their character, to decide controversies; but, through the fault of human weakness and wickedness, it happens that this effect does not always, nor with all persons, follow their application; just as the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to all such as believe, Rom. 1:16, yet, at the same time, not all are actually converted and saved by the preaching of the Gospel.”

—BR. (161): “Doubtless, all controversies that relate to matters of faith and practice, necessary to be decided and known, can, in this way, be adjudged and decided; only, when an occasion of controversy occurs, let those who are to engage in it, bring to the task minds that are pious, truth-loving, and learned. For thus, prejudice and partiality and evil feelings being laid aside, and the arguments of both sides being duly weighed, according to the rule of Scripture, it easily become apparent which is the true and which is the false opinion, on account of the perspicuity of Scripture, which acts in this case by virtue of its appointed office. But, as to other questions, either side of which may be held without injury to the faith, their decision ought not to be demanded, or expected, to be so clear.”

[18] HOLL. (125): “The causative authority of the faith differs from the canonical authority of Scripture, because the Scriptures beget divine faith, through the inspired sense, which sense of Scripture remains one and the same, whether expressed in the original idiom of Scripture, or in a translation conformed to the original text. So that the illuminating power, connected with the sense of Scripture, effectually manifests itself in the production of faith, not only by means of Scripture in the original tongues, but also through translations, provided the translations be perspicuous and conformed to the authentic text. Such is Luther’s translation of the Bible, which is used in our churches by the faithful; which, when read, or heard, is as efficacious in causing assent to the faith, as if they should read the Hebrew text of the Old Testament and the Greek of the New, or hear it read and expounded by a teacher, although the words of that translation were not immediately inspired by God. But, that the Scriptures may have canonical authority, it is necessary, that not only the sense, but also the words, shall have been derived immediately from God. For to canonical and normal authority in matters of doctrine and practice, an absolute certainty and infallibility in the words themselves is necessary, which does not exist except in the original text of Scripture, for this depends immediately upon divine inspiration. Translations are the work of men, who, in translating the Scriptures, may have erred.”

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Taken from: The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, by Heinrich Schmid, D. D., and translated from German and Latin by Charles A. Hay, D. D. and Henry E. Jacobs, D.D. (1889)

The Authority of Scripture in Reformed Theology

The divinity or inspired character of Holy Scripture is revealed to the believer first of all as the attribute of authority itself. “The authority of Holy Scripture is a dignity and excellence pertaining to Holy Scripture alone, above all other writings, by which it is and is held to be authentic, i.e., infallibly certain, so that by absolute necessity it must be believed and obeyed by all because of God its Author” (Polan, i, 16).

In virtue of this, Holy Scripture is the principle of the whole of theology, the exclusive norm of Christian doctrine, and the infallible judge in all doctrinal disputes; and in such wise that all that the vocabulary of Scripture, or its unquestionable inferences contain, is dogma; whereas the opposite of it is error; and anything else, even if it does not contradict Scripture, is indifferent and unnecessary for the soul’s salvation.

—LIEDEN SYNOPSIS (iii, 18–19): “This Scripture alone is the principle from which and the substance from which all saving truth is to be deduced, the canon and norm by which every true and so every false doctrine of things divine must be measured—in a word the αὐτόπιστος and irrefutable witness and judge, i.e. its own evidence, by which every controversy raised about divine things should be judged. The criterion or norm of judgment is contained in the following axioms; (1) whatever is contained in it or agrees with it either expressly or by a valid inference is true dogma; (2) that which disagrees must necessarily be false; (3) while whatever is not contained in it, although it does not directly disagree with it, is not a dogma necessary to salvation.”

The authority of Scripture i.e. its divinity and authenticity in no wise rests, even quoad nos, upon the Church’s acknowledgment, but simply and solely upon Scripture itself, which as God’s word is αὐτόπιστος and ἀνυπεύθυνος. The sole evidence with which absolute certainty assures the Christian of the divineness and authority of Holy Scripture is therefore the evidence which Scripture bears to itself, or which God bears to it in the conscience of the believer—the evidence of the Holy Spirit. This is given to the believer in the fact that the longing for salvation which fills him reaches full satisfaction through the Holy Spirit, that the Spirit of God which animates him is recognized again in Holy Scripture, and that his own life of faith is furthered by it more and more, in an ever more benedictory fashion. But as a result, the divinity and authority of Scripture can also be recognized only by the Christian who can experience the evidence of the Holy Spirit.

Other proofs which are used to ground the divine authenticity of Scripture have therefore value for the Christian only so far as they can be used to uphold the authority of Scripture from without. To these belong the evidence of the Church, which transmits Holy Scripture to the individual Christian as the word of God acknowledged by it at all times (which tradition has no more value than the evidence of heretics, Jews and heathen); as well as the fulfilled predictions of Scripture (especially the destruction of Jerusalem and the earlier divine guidance of the Jewish nation); and the miracles by the performance of which the authors of Scripture are certified by God Himself to be men of God.

But the question of the authority is identical with the question of the knowability of its divinity or inspiration. And in answering this question all Reformed dogmaticians are in essential agreement, since all adduce the testimonium Spiritus sancti as the real proof, besides which (with various deviations from each other) they adduce various other arguments as auxiliary proofs of lesser value.

—WESTMINSTER CONFESSION (1.5): “We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverent esteem of the holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man’s salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.

—CALVIN argues thus (I, vii, 4): If we are asked for a proof of the divineness of the content of H. Scripture, we must reply that “the testimony of the H. Spirit is more outstanding than all reason. As God alone can properly bear witness to His own words, so these words will not obtain credit in the hearts of men, until they are sealed by the inward testimony of the Spirit. Thus the same Spirit who spake by the mouth of the prophets must penetrate to our hearts, to persuade us that they have faithfully delivered what they were entrusted with by God”.

Only for him who has this witness of the Holy Spirit can other arguments have significance as supports of faith, to convince him of the divinity of Scripture. Scripture is thus αὐτόπιστος, its repute rests purely on itself and is therefore in no wise dependent on the authority of the Church.

The expression of Augustine adduced by the Papists to contradict this statement: “I should not believe the Gospel, were I not moved thereto by the authority of the Catholic Church” is rightly connected by Calvin with Augustine’s situation, in which “he was involved with the Manichees”; so that his view was: “since he was a stranger to the faith, he could not otherwise be brought to embrace the gospel as the sure truth of God, unless he was overcome by the authority of the Church”. All later dogmaticians explain this expression in exactly the same way.

—MUSCULUS rightly remarks, p. 181, that here ‘crederem’ is equivalent to ‘credidissem’. Those who assert that “all authority of Scripture depends on the Church” act foolishly (as Virellius says in Relig. Christ. compend., p. 3), “as though one should say that the light of the sun depends upon the testimony of man. As the sun will not cease to shine although all men should be blind, so the divine word will never take harm, whether it be approved of men or not”.

—URSINUS (Loci, p. 436) teaches exactly the same. The most essential “evidence” of the “certainty of Scripture” is the testimony of the H. Spirit. “This testimony is unique, proper only to those reborn by the Spirit of Christ and known only to them. And it has such power that it not only attests and seals abundantly in our souls the truth of the prophetic and apostolic doctrine, but also effectually bends and moves our hearts to embrace and follow it.”

Only for him who has experienced this testimony of the Holy Spirit in his heart can the other arguments (antiquity of doctrine, prophecies, miracles, etc.) adduced for the inspiration of the canonical books in Scripture, have the real force of proof. For the individual of course, the authority of the Church may be the means by which he attains to belief in Scripture, since it stimulates and educates him, etc. But it does not follow that the repute of Scripture is dependent upon the authority of the Church. It is rather the same here with the Church as it is with the woman at Sychar, Jn. 4:42.

“Many of the Samaritans are said to have believed in Christ because of the woman’s words in testimony, that he had told her all things that she had done. But after they had had Christ with them for two days, many more believed because of his words. Therefore, as the men of Sychar were first moved by the woman’s tale to believe in Christ, after they had seen and heard Christ himself they were so confirmed, that they now said that they would believe, even if the woman were silent. So it may be the case that those not yet converted or still weak, may, by the testimony of the Church as more impressing them visually, be moved to have faith in Scripture; yet after they have been irradiated by the richer light of faith, they experience confirmation that Scripture is the word of God by a far higher and surer testimony—though all angels and men should be persuading them of something different” (Ursinus?).

Thus the solely real witness to the divinity of Scripture is the witness that Scripture gives of itself, “because God Himself bears this witness”. Hence the constant description of Holy Scripture as αὐτόπιστος and ἀνυπεύθυνος.

—BULLINGER (I, 2) is most precise in describing the Reformed Church conception of the certitudo of H. Scripture: “Briefly, since Scripture is the Word of God, it must be believed without doubt.”

Summing up the most essential statements in this doctrinal development PISCATOR (p. 16) teaches that Holy Scripture proves itself to be θεόπνευστος and αὐτόπιστος, purely by the witness of the H. Spirit; in addition to which he emphasizes the following “proofs” for establishing faith in Scripture:

“(1) its heavenly majesty, (2) the mutual consent of all its parts, (3) the admiration which it draws us into, (4) the number and greatness of its miracles, (5) the wonderful fulfillment of prophecies, (6) the consent of the Church, (7) the blood of the martyrs.”

Even later this conception of Holy Scripture was retained unchanged alike in the Federal theology and in Scholasticism, and the nature of the testimony of the H. Spirit was defined with special care.

—HEIDEGGER (Corp. Theol. II, 14): “This witness of the Holy Spirit is not a bare persuasion of mind which may be liable to error, or an irrational movement of the heart such as enthusiasts hawk as divine. But it is its glow and shining in our dark hearts, affording us the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, 2 Cor. 4:6, so that, natural obstacles having been thus removed, we may be able to look within at all the excellency and wealth of the divine word.”

The relation of the witness of the Church about Scripture to that of the Holy Spirit is described by HEIDEGGER (Medull. Theol. II, viii): “The witness of the Church” is “not authentic and fundamental but εἰσαγωγικὸν and ὑπηρετικόν”. In the same sense WOLLEBIUS p. 3: “This witness is twofold, fundamental and ministerial. The witness of the Holy Spirit is fundamental (principale)—while the witness of the Church is ministerial.”

—VOETIUS V, 14: “As there is no objective certainty about the authority of Scripture, save as infused and imbued by God the Author of Scripture, so we have no subjective certainty of it, no formal concept of the authority of Scripture, except from God illuminating and convincing inwardly through the H. Spirit. As Scripture itself, as if radiating an outward principle by its own light (no outsider intervening as principle or means of proof or conviction), is something ἀξιοπιστόν or credible per se and in se—so the H. Spirit is the inward, supreme, first, independent principle, actually opening and illuminating the eyes of our mind, effectually convincing us of the credible authority of Scripture, from it, along with it and through it, so that being drawn we run, and being passively convicted within we acquiesce.”

—ALSTED (31) gives the strongest expression: “The authority and certitude of Scripture depends on the witness of the H. Spirit and this proof is the greatest of proofs. For the authority of any saying or writing depends upon its actual author. Much depends upon this rule, which is the basis of the whole of theology.”

Since the authority of Holy Scripture coincides with the authority of God, it is essentially an absolute authority. At the same time, there is founded on the contents of Scripture a distinction in its authority. So far as everything that Scripture recounts is absolutely certain historical truth, it possesses “historical authority or authenticity”. But so far as it contains the absolutely divine norms of faith and life, it possesses “normative authority or authenticity”. From this it is clear that the “historical” stretches further than the “normative” authority. The former applies to the entire content of Scripture, the latter only to a part of it, since what Scripture records about the works, words, and thoughts of the devil and the godless has historical authority but not normative.

—TURRETIN (II, iv, 2) says briefly: “One authentia is of history or of narrative: there is another over and above of truth and of norm. According to the former whatever is narrated in Scripture is most true, just as it is narrated, whether good or bad, true or false. But the latter those things are said to possess, which are true in themselves, so that they may be transmitted as the norm of faith and morals. Not everything in Scripture has authentia normae, as those recorded to have been said by the godless or a devil. Yet everything has authentia historiae.”

Likewise pretty well all the dogmaticians.

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Taken and adapted from: Reformed Dogmatics, by Heinrich Heppe, and translated by G. T. Thomson (2007), 19-28

The Use of Reason in Reformed Theology

Natural knowledge of God is inadequate to achieve eternal blessedness. Man convicted by his consciousness of sinfulness learns thereby that God punishes us, but of himself he knows nothing of what God’s will is for the sinner according to His grace. Religio naturalis is thus not salutaris, and can only make man inexcusable, for not accepting revelation. Besides this, man by himself cannot so know what he does know about God through reason and conscience as he ought to know.

—HEIDEGGER (I, 9): “The kind of knowledge of God and of divine things that may be drawn from nature and its principles cannot be so connected with salvation as to be saving. Man the sinner can in no wise know the will and good pleasure of God outside of His revelation. In addition, what man can naturally know about God under the leading of reason and wit, man the yet unsatisfied animal does not know as it can and ought to be known”.

—DANAEUS (Isag. 1, p. 102 ff.) enumerates the distinguishing marks of natural knowledge of God, as distinguished from revealed: “First of all, this knowledge, derived only from God’s visible works or from this world, is true enough; but it is insufficient for salvation, because a peculiar knowledge of redemption is required for salvation. Secondly, this general knowledge does teach that God exists and that He is to be worshipped; for it knows that He is mighty and righteous and wise. But it does not recognise either who this God is or how He is to be worshipped. Thirdly, this general knowledge of God is chiefly sustained by the witness of conscience, which is given by God to every man that cometh into the world (Jn. 1:17). And so, as for a host of reasons this power and voice of our conscience is either suffocated or disappears or is destroyed or corrupted, the same befalls this general knowledge of God in us. Still, it cannot be abandoned, just as the force of conscience cannot be abandoned either. In short, as appears from the above, this general knowledge of God only renders us inexcusable in God’s sight, but does not contain or transmit the doctrine of salvation. By it, we know the one God to be an august majesty and an incomprehensible power. But we do not understand that He is merciful to us in His Son”.

Yet what natural religion teaches about God, although imperfect is not therefore untrue. At the same time “this knowledge”, says COCCEIUS (Summ. Theol., I, 4), “is true although it is not adequate. The things known of God, partly negatively by the setting apart of those that belong to weakness and imperfection, partly by the image, partly by the attribution of inaccessible eminence (for we recognise that He dwells in light inaccessible), are devoid of falsehood: even though there is more in the actual fact than can be perceived by us.”

Natural religion is also useful. On the one hand man is deprived of every excuse, as against God, for not believing in God and not fulfilling His lawful will. On the other hand the natural man who seeks peace with God through religio naturalis will the more joyfully and thankfully accept the revelation of God’s grace, if it is imparted to him. And the regenerate man who has received the revelation of grace and believes in it will be all the better able to understand and see through God’s revelation in nature.

—HEIDEGGER (I, 12): “In short, natural knowledge of God is not useless because not saving. As regards God it has this use, that it renders the man who blames fate, the μεμψίμοιρος, without excuse, ἀναπολόγητος, Rom. 7:20, as regards man it profits to this extent, that both the not yet regenerate seeking God and His salvation in nature, if haply they may grope after and find Him Ac. 17:27, in grace or by the Word of God, the Spirit of God taking the lead, take it up and greet it when found: and the regenerate already taught from God’s word about the true God and the way of His salvation, a return as it were to nature having been instituted, look up more also from God’s admirable works to His power, wisdom and goodness, worship His majesty and put all their trust in the one and only God of Israel, who alone doeth such things.”

Man is aware in his conscience that he is a transgressor against God’s commandment and thereby guilty in God’s sight; and yet by his natural knowledge of God he knows God only as the righteous judge of good and evil. Religio naturalis, then, cannot ensure any man peace with God or be in any sense a religio satisfying to Himself or to man. It actually points beyond itself, since it arouses in man the need and longing for a revelation, by which man must first rightly conceive what it means for a God to exist, and by which he must recognise, that God may also be the sinner’s God, that God will also be sought of the sinner and how He will also be found of him.

—COCCEIUS (S.T., I, 17): “There was every need for revelation, not only that man might be roused to a νόησις and attention to God’s creatures, so as to behold in them the invisible things of God and so feel after God and find Him; but much more that he might learn what it means that God exists, and in this perfection might be aware of the second one which drives him nearer to God, that God may be the sinner’s God; then that he might perceive that grandest glory of God,” which is to will to be sought and found of the sinner; lastly, how He must be sought in order that He may be found. Without this knowledge and faith it is impossible to please God, i.e., to approach Him, to walk with Him, to do things pleasing to Him and to worship Him, Heb. 11:6.” Similarly HEIDEGGER (I, 13).

Man then may with complete certainty recognise what real revelation of God is. If he compares what is proclaimed to him as revelation with his natural consciousness of God, he finds that the latter is satisfied by the former, that revelation enables him to know God in His absolute majesty, his own heart in its sinful misery and at the same time a sure comfort regarding it. But this knowledge is not imparted to man by flesh and blood, but solely by the Spirit of grace, who opens a man’s eyes and directs his heart, that he may achieve a certain knowledge of revealed fact.

—HEIDEGGER (I, 27): “This watchfulness man possesses not by nature but by grace and the Spirit of God, who renders him spiritual and bends his heart thereto and opens his eyes, 1 Jn. 5:7 (it is the Spirit that beareth witness, because the Spirit is truth)”.

The doctrine of the Arminians is rejected (RIISSEN, I, 9): “who lay it down that the light of grace is acquired by the right use of natural light and that by grace we reach glory”. Although in and for itself reason is capable of absorbing supernatural truths, it is impossible for fallen man’s reason to conceive them for itself.

—VOETIUS (I, p. 3): “We presuppose that the supernatural truths of divine faith surpass the reason of man as such. He does not perceive them unless he is raised up and informed by a higher light. But they are not repugnant to him per se or as such, only through the accident of corruption and the wicked disposition which inheres in our mind.”

Generally, then religio naturalis and religio revelata are so related to one another, that the latter is the confirmation of the former (since it absorbs it into itself); and the latter mediates revelation’s point of contact in man. Yet it must by no means be concluded from this that reason, i.e., “the faculty of the rational soul in man by which he apprehends and adjudicates upon things intelligible” (VOETIUS I, 1), may in any way be the principle of knowledge by faith. Not for a moment can this be said of the reason illumined by revelation. On the contrary, the sole principle of religious knowledge must be the light from which even the Christian’s reason has its illumination, namely, revelation; or (since as a matter of order God only reveals Himself by the Word) the Word of Holy Scriptures.

—VOETIUS (I, 3–4): “With these provisos we say that no human reason is the principle by which or through which or in consequence of which or by reason of which we believe, or the foundation or law or norm of what is to be believed, by the prescription of which we judge”.

—HEIDEGGER (I, 33) says that “we must not judge by reason even healed by grace, but according to the principle admitted by illuminated reason, namely, according to Scripture.”

—RIISSEN (I, 11, 1) quotes the following arguments: “Although reason is the instrument or the means by which we may be led to faith, it is not the principle on which dogmas of faith are proved or the foundation on which they rest: (1) (because) the reason of unregenerate man is blind as regards law, Eph. 4:17, 18 (… ye no longer walk … in the vanity of the mind, being darkened in understanding, alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in (you), because of (the) hardening of (your) heart), Rom. 8:7 (the mind of the flesh is enmity against God), Eph. 5:8 (ye were once darkness …), 1 Cor. 2:14 (the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; (for) they are foolishness unto him); (2) the mysteries of faith are above the sphere of reason, and to them animal man cannot rise; (3) faith is ultimately resolvable not into reason, so that I ought to believe because I thus understand and grasp, but into the Word, because God thus speaks in Scripture; (4) reason cannot be the norm of religion, either as corrupt (because it is not only beneath faith but against it), or as sound (because such reason is not found in corrupt man).”

Thus “the solid and sure architectonic principle of theology” is “divine revelation” (COCCEUIS Aphor. prolixiores, 11, 7) and revelation mediated by the Word. “Ordinarily God reveals nothing apart from the Word” (COCCEIUS ibid. II, 8).

Of course, Christianity is called by the apostle a “reasonable service”, Rom. 12:1. This, however, must only imply that it consists not in Levitical ordinances, usages and works, but in the worship of God in spirit and truth. In consequence of this, on the other hand, it must also be insisted that Christianity is not directed against reason, that it would not kill it or set it aside, but that it would rather work upon man directly through reason, i.e., not magically but morally.

—HEIDEGGER (I, 39): “The Christian religion is indeed a reasonable service (cultus) Rom. 12:11 not because it is built up from reason or to its norm and scale, but because it is not σωματική, σαρκική, as Israel’s was in part, but inward, spiritual. Thus faith conquers reasoning and leads every reason captive to obedience in Christ, yet so that it does not remove sobriety and light of mind or truth naturally known, but actually conquers by it, by the leading of God’s Spirit and His Word. In revealing God does not push men about like ζῶα ἄλογα or automata, but He speaks to φρόνιμοι, 1 Cor. 10:15 (who can judge what an apostle says). Faith does not destroy reason but stimulates it, does not get it involved but directs it, does not blind the mind but illuminates it.”

Hence the use of reason in theology is perfectly justified. By it (1) the true God must be proved to be the author of revelation; (2) the logical harmony or (and of course it holds only on the supposition of faith!) the rationality of revealed truths must be set forth; (3) the connection of conclusions resulting from each of them is to be developed; and (4) the entire natural, historical, linguistic, etc., knowledge of theology to be made use of. But only faith makes it possible for man to use reason in this correct way and, in dealing with truths which belong only to revelation, to limit it to such an usus organicus, in which illumined and led by the Holy Spirit it adopts revelation, distinguishes the true from the false by the plumb-line of the Word of God, scientifically illumines the mysteries of faith and demonstrates the connection of the separate truths of faith.

—HEIDEGGER (I, 39): “Illumined reason is of no contemptible use to theology. And its chief use consists in the fact that forthwith it brings forth from its own treasury arguments on behalf of faith. This happens in four ways. Firstly, reason urged and directed by the Spirit of God through sure and undoubted criteria and signs of divinity discovers that he who reveals the way of salvation, God, is not an imposter, demon or man suspected of falsehood. Secondly, illumined reason puts forth arguments for the principles of Christian faith, by which it shows to the unbelieving of those who embrace it its worthiness of credit, which is not a thing impossible, irrational or contrary to man’s uncorrupted nature; and it dissolves subtleties adduced to the contrary by a perverse reason. Thirdly, reason occasionally proceeds in accordance with its own principles by collecting suitable arguments on behalf of faith, in those matters which are known both by faith and by reason; or arguments at least known by faith, which stimulates reason in many, are confirmed by reason. Fourthly, in a word reason, accompanying the use of words and of the things signified by these words, whether natural ideas and reasons which we have of and for the things and which revelation presupposes, has power of judgment on equal terms, i.e., those considered apart from construction or conjunction. Use is the judge in familiar words which are not proper and peculiar to revelation. Faith alone judges upon the supernatural construction and conjunction of simple words or terms which belong to revelation alone. The H. Spirit alone secures our right use of reason and the propriety of our faith.” The result of this is that “the use of reason in things which depend on sheer, pure revelation is merely instrumental (organicus)”, i.e., “(1) a man humbly receives and tests revelation in the bosom of reason by the previous Spirit and His Word; (2) in the doctrine of religion reason is an instrument for judging true and false, certain and uncertain, etc., but only if preceded by the light of the divine Word and the inward illumination of the H. Spirit; (3) by the aid of languages and the arts reason throws light upon mysteries solidly proved from the Word of God; (4) reason compares one word of God with another word of God, the OT with the NT, etc., one dogma of faith with another.”

—RIISSEN (I, 11): “The use of human reason in theology is (1) to perceive things revealed, Mt. 13:51 (Have ye understood these things?… Yea!); (2) to compare them with other things, Ac. 17:11 (received the word with all readiness, examining the scriptures daily whether these things were so); (3) to explain, Neh. 8:8 (they read in the book … and they gave the sense so that they understood the reading); (4) to distinguish the false; for it is necessary to search out things that differ, Phil. 1:10 (prove or approve the things that differ); (5) to clear it of objections, Rom. 9 (the ‘God forbids!’).”

Thus by believing surrender to revelation and by a use of reason which puts reason at the service of faith in revelation there grows up a theologia revelata, which, as the first rightly to prove that “natural theology” is preliminary knowledge of God in its true significance, is “the doctrine of God reconciling man the sinner to Himself in Christ and duly to be known of him and worshipped in godly-wise, a doctrine taught of God who reveals it by His Word, and purely instituted as in His presence for man the sinner’s salvation and for the glory of God’s name” (HEIDEGGER I, 14).

On this view theology is a science which rests essentially on the facts of revelation and is meant to be not a pure awareness but a life. Hence it does not, like the purely human science, belong only to a spiritual power of man’s. It pertains to his whole personality, so that in cultivating it the whole man with all the powers of his spiritual and moral life must play his part with reason and understanding, with heart and soul, with knowledge and conscience.

—TURRETIN (I, vi, 4): “None of the intellectual functions as treated in ethics and contradistinguished from each other can constitute the true and proper genus of theology. (1) All these habits are habits of knowing. But theology is a habit not of knowing but of believing. (2) Natural habits were discovered and developed by the ingenuity of man. Theology is supernatural and θεόδοτος; its principle is not human reason but divine revelation. (3) They are all theoretical or practical simply. Theology is of a mixed category, partly theoretical, partly practical. But although theology cannot properly and strictly be called any one of these habits, it is nevertheless well said that it includes them all in itself in an eminent degree.”

Since theology has also to acknowledge and to expound what belongs to natural religion, we may distinguish between “simple (pure) articles”, which rest purely upon revelation, and “mixed articles”, in the exposition of which reason too has its substantial share. Only it must be maintained that the basic doctrines of theology (Trinity, Fall of human race, Redeemer, True Blessedness and the Single Way to it) may be known purely from revelation, and that withal Holy Scripture in every part of its doctrinal system is the sheer authority.

—ALSTED (Theol. Didact., p. 7): “Since theological questions are of two kinds, simple and mixed, of which the former consist of purely theological terms, the latter of a theological term and a philosophical, no one of sound mind could fail to see that philosophy can be applied to proof only in the latter category, in the former merely to assertion and explanation.”

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Taken and adapted from: Reformed Dogmatics, by Heinrich Heppe, and translated by G. T. Thomson (2007), 3–11.

The Use of Reason in Lutheran Theology

By the term Reason, we may understand either, the capacity of intellectual apprehension in general — and this is essential to man, for it is only by means of this capacity, which distinguishes him from irrational animals, that he can comprehend the truths of religion; [1] or, the capacity of acquiring knowledge and appropriating truths. [2] The knowledge, however, which one thus acquires is, even if true, still defective and unsatisfactory, [3] and therefore Reason is by no means the source from which man can draw the knowledge of saving truths, [4] but for these the revelation contained in Holy Scripture remains ever the only source.

The question now arises, How is Reason related to this revelation, and what use can Theology make of Reason?

Inasmuch as Reason also derives its knowledge from God, Reason and Revelation are, of course, not opposed to each other. [5] This holds true, however, only of Reason considered per se, of Reason as it was before the fall of man. This would have remained conscious of the limits of its sphere; would not have sought to measure divine things by the rule of natural knowledge; would have subordinated itself to Revelation, [6] and would have known that there are truths which, although not in antagonism with it, are yet far beyond its reach. [7]

But the case is very different with Reason as it dwells now in fallen man; for we must concede that, by man’s fall, such a change has occurred that Reason now often assumes a position of antagonism to revealed truth. [8] It still, indeed, possesses some knowledge of divine things, but this knowledge is obscured in proportion to the moral depravity of man, and it now, more easily than before, transcends the assigned limits. If now Reason, even before the fall of man, had to keep within modest limits, with respect to the truths of Revelation, much less dare it now, in the fallen condition of man, assume to judge in regard to divine things, or subject the truths of Revelation to its tests; still less dare it reject that which does 30not seem to agree with its knowledge: its duty rather is to subject itself to Revelation and learn therefrom. If this be done, however, much will again become intelligible that previously appeared contradictory, and Reason will again approach the condition occupied before the Fall. But this will be only an approach to that condition; for just as man, even through regeneration, never again becomes entirely sinless, so the Reason of the regenerate never attains its original power. [9] We may therefore say of Reason, even when enlightened, that it can have no decisive judgment in regard to matters of faith, and possesses in such matters no normative authority, all the more since this was true of Reason before the Fall. [10]

As to the use, then, that is to be made of Reason in Theology, it follows, from what has been said, that Reason stands in the relation merely of a handmaid to the latter. [11] In so far as it is the capacity for intellectual apprehension in general, the use that is to be made of it will consist in this, that man, by its help, intellectually apprehends the truths of Theology, and accepts from it the means of refuting opponents. In so far, however, as it also conveys knowledge, one may also employ it in the demonstration of a divine truth; in such a case, Reason would contribute whatever of natural knowledge it has acquired. And just in the same proportion as Reason has suffered itself to be enlightened by divine Revelation, will it be able to demonstrate the harmony of divine truth with natural knowledge. [12]

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NOTES & SOURCES

[1] Cal. (I, 358): “Human Reason denotes two things. On the one hand, it designates the intellect of man, that faculty of the rational soul that must be exercised in every kind of knowledge, since it is only by the reason or intellect that man can understand.” . . . HOLL. (69): “Without the use of reason we cannot understand or prove theological doctrines, or defend them against the artful objections of opponents. Surely not to brutes, but to men using their sound reason, has God revealed the knowledge of eternal salvation in His Word, and upon them He has imposed the earnest injunction to read, hear, and meditate upon His Word. The intellect is therefore required, as the receiving subject or apprehending instrument. As we can see nothing without eyes, and hear nothing without ears, so we understand nothing without reason.”

[2] CAL. (ibid.): “On the other hand, Reason, denotes Philosophy itself, or the principles known from nature, and the discussion or ratiocination based upon these known principles.” These principles are divided “into organic and philosophical (strictly so-called). The former (organic) relate to the mediate disciplines, grammar, rhetoric, and logic.” (QUEN. (I, 39): “These are to be employed in Theology, as the means of becoming acquainted with Theology, since without them, neither the sense nor significance of the words can be derived, nor the figures and modes of speech be properly weighed, nor the connection and consequences be perceived, nor discussions be instituted”). The latter (the philosophical) are again divided into “philosophical principles absolutely and unrestrictedly universal (general or transcendental), which consist of a combination of terms essential and simply necessary, so that they cannot be overthrown by any argument, not even by the Scripture; e.g., ‘It is impossible for anything to be and not to be at the same time;’” and “philosophical principles restrictedly universal (special or particular), which are indeed true, to a certain extent, hypothetically, or so far as mere natural knowledge extends, but which, nevertheless, admit of limitation, and which may be invalidated by counter evidence drawn from revelation, if not from nature; e.g., ‘As many as are the persons, so many are the essences,’ etc.” HOLL (68). Through these philosophical sources, we can also gain a knowledge of God, for there is a natural knowledge of God, described elsewhere by the Theologians under the heads of the innate, and the acquired knowledge of God.

[3] CAL. (II, 47): “Of the natural knowledge of God there is predicated, as to those things that are revealed in nature, imperfection; and as to the supernatural mysteries of faith, entire worthlessness [nullitas].

[4] HOLL. (69): “Meanwhile, nevertheless, human reason is not a fountain, or primordial element, from which the peculiar and fundamental principles of faith are derived.”

[5] FLACIUS, with his assertion, that “the knowledge of God, naturally implanted, is a light full of error, fallacious and deceptive,” and subsequently, Daniel Hofmann (“Philosophy is hostile to Theology; what is true in Philosophy is false in Theology”), gave especial occasion to dispute the antagonism between Reason and Revelation.

CAL. (I, 68): “That Philosophy is not opposed to Theology and is by no means to be rejected as brutish, terrene, impure, diabolical, we thus demonstrate:

1. Because the true agrees with the true, and does not antagonize it. But what is known by the light of nature is no less true than what is revealed in Scripture

2. Because natural and philosophical knowledge has its origin from God

3. Because Philosophy leads us to the knowledge of God.”

As the antagonism was still asserted, the Theologians endeavored to prove it to be only apparent.

—CAL. (I, 74): “We must distinguish between a real and an apparent contradiction. The maxims of Philosophy and the conclusions of Theology do not really contradict each other, but only appear to do so; for they either do not discuss the same subject, or they do not describe the same condition, mode, or relation to it; as when the philosopher says that the essence is multiplied with the multiplication of persons, he declares this of finite and created persons, not of divine, of which he knows nothing; concerning the latter, the theologian teaches that this is not true. When the philosopher says, ‘Of nothing, nothing comes,’ i.e., by way of generation, he does not contradict the theologian, who teaches that by the way of creation, something does come from nothing. Let Philosophy remain within the limits of its own sphere, then it will not contradict Theology, for this treats of a different subject. But it is not wonderful that those who confound Philosophy and Theology should find contradictions between them, for they pervert both.”

—QUEN. (I, 43): “We must distinguish between contrariety and diversity. Philosophy and the principles of Reason are not indeed contrary to Theology, nor the latter to the former; but there is a very great difference between those things that are divinely revealed in Scripture and those which are known by the light of nature.”

As the Theologians here opposed those who asserted a contradiction between Reason and Revelation, they also controverted those who claimed too much for Reason, as over against Revelation, by maintaining that, because Reason came from God, that which opposes it cannot be true. This charge was brought against the Calvinists, Socinians, and Arminians. It was admitted, in opposition to them, that Reason in itself does not contradict Revelation; an inference, however, which might have become derogatory to divine truth, was obviated by explaining any seeming contradiction on the ground that Reason, in such a case, had overstepped its proper limits.

To the proposition: “In nowise can that be true which is repugnant to reason,” GRH. (II, 371) replies: “Not human Reason, but divine Revelation, is the source of faith, nor are we to judge concerning the articles of faith according to the dictation of Reason, otherwise we should have no articles of faith, but only decisions of Reason. The cogitations and utterances of Reason are to be restricted and restrained within the sphere of those things which are subject to the decisions of Reason, and not to be extended to the sphere of those things which are placed entirely beyond the reach of Reason; otherwise, if they should be received as absolutely universal, and are found opposed to the mysteries of the faith, there arise oppositions of science falsely so-called.

To the objection: “As a smaller light to a greater, so Reason is not contrary to Scripture,” GRH. (II, 372) answers: “This contrariety is not necessary, but accidental. Reason restricted to its proper sphere is not contrary to Scripture, but when it attempts to overleap and surpass this, and to pass judgment upon the highest mysteries of the faith by the aid of its own principles, then, by accident, it comes in conflict with Scripture which informs us in regard to the mysteries of faith. Just as the stronger light often reveals those things which were hidden in the weaker, so the light of grace, enkindled for us in the Word, makes manifest those things which were hidden in the light of nature. Just as any one, therefore, who would deny those things which are visible in the greater light because he had not seen them in the smaller, would fail to appreciate the design and benefit of the smaller, so also he who denies or impugns the mysteries of faith revealed in the light of grace, on the ground that they are incongruous with Reason and the light of nature, fails, at the same time, to make a proper use of the office and benefits of Reason and the light of nature.”

To the proposition: “What is true theologically cannot be false philosophically, for truth is one,” GRH. (ibid.) answers: “In themselves considered, there is no contrariety, no contradiction between Philosophy and Theology, because whatever things concerning the deepest mystery of the faith Theology propounds from Revelation, these a wiser and sincere Philosophy knows are not to be discussed and estimated according to the principles of Reason, lest there be a confusion of what pertains to entirely distinct departments. So when Theology teaches that Mary brought forth and yet remained a virgin, a truly sensible Philosophy does not say this assertion is contrary to its conclusion, that it is impossible for a virgin to bear a child, because it knows that that conclusion must necessarily be received with this limitation, that for a virgin to bring forth a child naturally and yet remain a virgin, is impossible. Nor does Theology assert the contrary of this, for it says, by supernatural and divine power it came to pass that a virgin brought forth a child. But when some philosophizer attempts to make his axioms and assertions so general that the highest mysteries of the faith are to be adjudged by them, and so invades other spheres, then it comes to pass, by way of accident, that what is true theologically 34is pronounced false philosophically; i.e., not according to the proper use of a sound Philosophy, but according to the miserable abuse of it. Thus, justice and the nature of law is everywhere the same, i.e., in its general conception, while, nevertheless, the law of this province is not the same as that of other provinces, but each government lives under its own special laws. So truth is one in its general conception, while each branch has its own axioms which are not to be dragged before another tribunal, but to be left in their own sphere.”

[6] GRH. (II, 372): “Sound reason is not opposed to the faith, if we accept as such that which is truly and properly so-called, namely that which does not transcend the limits of its sphere, and does not arrogate to itself decisions in regard to the mysteries of faith; or which, enlightened by the Word, and sanctified by the Holy Spirit, does not follow its own principles in the investigation of the mysteries of faith, but the light of the Word and the guidance of the Holy Spirit.”

[7] GRH. (II, 372): “The articles of faith are not in and of themselves contrary to Reason, but only above Reason. It may happen, by accident, that they be contrary to Reason, namely, when Reason assumes to decide concerning them upon its own principles, and does not follow the light of the Word, but denies and assails them. Hence the articles of faith are not contrary to, but merely above Reason, since Reason before the Fall was not yet corrupt and depraved; but since the Fall they are not only above but also contrary to corrupt Reason, for this, in so far as it is thus corrupt, cannot control itself, much less should it wish to judge articles of faith by its own principles.”

[8] GRH. (II, 371): “We must distinguish between Reason in man before and since the Fall. The former, as such, was never opposed to divine Revelation; the latter was very frequently thus opposed through the influence of corruption.” GRH. (II, 362): “Natural human Reason since the Fall (1) is blind, darkened by the mist of error, inwrapped in the shades of ignorance, exposed to vanity and error, Rom. 1:21; 1 Cor. 3:1; Gal. 4:8; Eph. 4:17; (2) unskilled in perceiving divine mysteries and judging concerning them, Matt. 11.27; 16:17; 1 Cor. 2:14 sq; (3) opposed to them, Rom. 8:6; 1 Cor. 2:11 sq; 3:18 sq.; hence to be brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ, 2 Cor. 10:4,5; (4) and we are commanded to beware of its seduction, Col. 2:8. Therefore natural human Reason cannot be a rule for judging in matters of faith, and any one pronouncing according to its dictation cannot be a judge in theological controversies.” QUEN. (I, 43): 35“We must distinguish between Philosophy (i.e., Reason) considered abstractly and in view of its essence, and Philosophy considered concretely and in view of its existence in a subject corrupted by sin: viewed in the former light, it is never opposed to divine truth (for the truth is ever presented as uniform and in harmony with the nature of the objects successively subordinated to it), but viewed in the latter light, in consequence of the ignorance of the intellect and the perversion of the will, it is often preposterously applied by the philosopher to the purposes of perversion and hollow deception. Col. 2:8.”

[9] GRH. (II, 371): “We are to make a distinction between the reason of man unregenerate and regenerate. The former counts the mysteries of faith foolishness, but the latter, in so far as it is such, does not object to them. Then only, and only so long, is it regenerate as it follows the light of the Word, and judges concerning the mysteries of the faith, not by its own principles, but by the Scriptures. We do not reject Reason when regenerated, renewed, illuminated by the Word of God, restrained and brought into captivity to the obedience of Christ; this does not draw its opinions, in matters of faith, from its own sources, but from Scripture; this does not impugn the articles of belief as does Reason when corrupt, left to itself, etc. We must distinguish also between Reason partially rectified in this life, and that which is fully rectified in the life to come. The former is not yet so completely renewed, illuminated, and rectified that it would be impossible for it to oppose the articles of faith and impugn them, if it should follow its own guidance. Just as there remains in the regenerate a struggle between the flesh and the spirit, by which they are tempted to sin, so there remains in them a struggle between faith and Reason, in so far as it is not yet fully renewed; this, however, excludes all opposition between faith and Reason.”

[10] QUEN. (I, 43): “Reason is admissible as an instrument, but not as a rule and a judge: the formal principles of Reason no one rejects; its material principles, which constitute its rule for judging the mysteries, no wise man accepts. No material principle of Reason, as such, but only as it is at the same time a part of Revelation, produces faith theologically: that God is, we know from nature; we believe it, however, only through the Scriptures. It does not follow, because some parts of Scripture are axioms known by nature, that therefore Reason is the regulator of theological controversies.” Id. (I, 43): “Theology does not condemn the use of Reason, but its abuse and its affectation of directorship, or its magisterial use, as normative and decisive in divine things.”

[11] HOLL. (71): “Reason is not a leader, but an humble follower of Theology. Hagar serves as the handmaid of her mistress, she does not command; when she affects to command she is banished from the sacred home.”

[12] QUEN. (I, 42): “A distinction must be made between the organic or instrumental use of Reason and its principles, when they are employed as instruments for the interpretation and exposition of the Holy Scriptures, in refuting the arguments of opponents, drawn from Nature and Reason, and discussing the signification and construction of words, and rhetorical figures and modes of speech; and the normal use of philosophical principles, when they are regarded as principles by which supernatural doctrines are to be tested. The former we admit, the latter we repudiate.” The following from QUEN. explains and expands this idea: “It is one thing to employ in Theology the principles and axioms of Philosophy for the purpose of illustration, explanation, and as a secondary proof, when a matter is decided by the Scriptures; and another to employ them for the purpose of deciding and demonstrating, or to recognize philosophical principles, or the argumentation based upon them, as authoritative in Theology, or by means of them to decide matters of faith. The former we do, the latter we do not. There must be a distinction made between consequences deduced by the aid of reason from the Holy Scriptures, and conclusions collected from the sources of nature and reason. The former must not be confounded with the latter. For it is one thing to use legitimate, necessary consequences, and another to use the principles of Reason. It is one thing to draw a conclusion and deduce consequences from the declarations of Scripture, according to logical rules, and another to collect consequences from natural principles. A sort of illustration of heavenly matters can be sought for among those things which Reason supplies, but a demonstration can never be obtained from that source, since it is necessary that this should proceed from the same sphere to which the truth which is to be proved belongs, and not from a foreign one.”

This doctrine of the use of reason GRH. develops in a manner somewhat different, although substantially the same as follows, under the topic, “The Use of Reason in the Rule of Faith.” (I, 76, sq.):

(1) The organic use is the following: When our reason brings with it, to the work of drawing out the treasures of divine wisdom hidden in the Scriptures, knowledge of the grammatical force of words, logical observance of order, rhetorical elucidation of figures and acquaintance with the facts of nature, derived from the philosophical branches. This use we greatly 37commend, yea, we even declare it to be necessary.

(2) As to the edificative use of Reason, it is to be thus maintained: There is a certain natural knowledge of God, Rom. 1:19,20, but his should be subordinate to that which is divinely revealed in the Word; so that, where there is a disagreement, the former should yield to the latter; and where they agree, the former confirms and strengthens the latter. In short, as a servant it should, with all due reverence, minister to the latter.

(3) The destructive use, when legitimate, is the following: Errors in doctrine are first to be confuted by arguments drawn from the Holy Scriptures, as the only and proper source of Theology, but afterwards philosophical reasons may be added, so that it may be shown that the false dogma is repugnant, not only to the light of grace, but also to the light of Nature. But when the truth of any doctrine has been clearly proved by unanswerable scriptural arguments, we should never allow our confidence in it to be shaken by any philosophical reasons, however specious they may be.”

Id. (II, 9): “Although some things are taught in Theology, which can be learned in some measure by the light of Nature and Reason, yet human Reason cannot undertake to become thoroughly acquainted with the mysteries of faith, properly so called, by means of its own powers; and as to such things as, already known from Nature, are taught in Theology, it need not seek for proof elsewhere than in their own proper source, the Word of God, which is abundantly able to prove them. . . . In this latter manner the Theologian becomes indebted, for some things to the philosopher; not, indeed, as though he were not able to know them without the aid of philosophical principles, from Scripture, as the proper and native source of his own science, but because, in the course of the investigation, he perceives the truth of the proposition according to the principles of philosophy.”

That to which GRH. here merely alludes, the later Theologians, such as QUEN., BR., and HOLL., develop at greater length when treating of the pure and mixed articles; by the former of which are understood those which contain truths that can be known only by Revelation, by the latter such as contain truths which may, at least in part, be otherwise known. HOLL. (68): “Mixed articles of faith may, in some measure, be known by the principles of Philosophy. But the pure articles of faith can be learned and proved only from Holy Scripture as the appropriate, fundamental, and original source.” But the remark of QUEN. is well worthy of attention, that (I, 39) “in the mixed articles we grant that philosophical principles may be employed; not, indeed, for the purpose 38of decision or demonstration, but merely for illustration, or as a sort of secondary proof of that which has already been decided by the Scriptures.” And here belongs also the statement of QUEN., concerning the formal and material principle of Reason, already quoted in the tenth note. This statement of QUEN. conveys the same idea as the last, quoted from GRH., and is designed to prevent the assignment of the right of decision in the mixed articles to Reason, although, it is to have something to do with them.

Those Theologians who observe the distinction, described in note second, between organic and philosophical principles, admit also the use of the absolutely universal principles in Theology. It may be questioned, however, Whether these are so accurately distinguished from the restrictedly universal principles which are not admissible, that mistakes may not easily arise.

In regard to this BR. (157) thus expresses himself: “The material principles of Reason are also with propriety employed; however, when they are particular or specific, they are subordinated to the universal principle of Theology; but the universal principles of Reason may be employed only when they are absolutely necessary, namely, when the demonstration of the opposite would imply a contradiction. For otherwise, if the principles of Reason were employed, not absolutely, but relatively, or, so to speak, universally and necessarily, it might easily happen that a conclusion would be reached repugnant to the mysteries or to the articles of faith, even to those of fundamental importance.”

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Taken from: The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, by Heinrich Schmid, D. D., and translated from German and Latin by Charles A. Hay, D. D. and Henry E. Jacobs, D.D. (1889)